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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 1941, Joe L. McCord, an enlisted man in the United
States Army Air Corps, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. After
McCord had enlisted in the Army, he was subsequently ordained as a
minister in the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (the Jehovah's
Witnesses).' Thereafter, McCord sought release from the Army be-
cause a tenet of his religion forbade him to salute either the flag or his
superior officers.2 The court of appeals opinion, in denying McCord's
release, relied on an opinion of the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered fifty years earlier which unequivocally gave the right to com-
mand to the officer and the duty of obedience to the soldier.' To date,
it is unknown what happened to McCord: whether patriotism or fear
of punishment overcame his religious ideals, or whether he persevered
in his beliefs and was punished for behavior which constituted of-
fenses under the Articles of War. What is known, however, is that
this was the first reported instance in American law in which a mem-
ber of the armed forces refused to obey lawful orders because of his
religious beliefs. Were prior soldiers, sailors and marines simply irre-
ligious, or had the military's disciplinary system somehow adjusted to
religious dissidence without intervention by the federal courts?
The only indication that there may have been cases of conscience
arising in the military before World War II is found in Colonel Win-
throp's 1886 publication, Military Law and Precedents, which states
that a service member may not defend disobedience by claiming that
the order was contrary to his religious scruples.4 The fact that such a
1. See McCord v. Page, 124 F.2d 68, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1941).
2. Unstated in the opinion, but apparently based on Exodus 20:4-5: "You shall not carve
idols for yourselves in the shape of anything in the sky above or on the earth below or in the
waters beneath the earth; you shall not bow down before them or worship them."
3. See McCord v. Page, 124 F.2d 68, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1941); see also In re Grimley, 137
U.S. 147, 153 (1890) (court-martial convictions not subject to collateral attack in federal court
system, as long as court-martial had jurisdiction over accused); see also Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
4. See W. WINTHROP, WINTHROP'S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 576-77 (2d. ed.
1920).
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statement existed suggests that some cases had arisen. Because Win-
throp relied solely on English authorities,5 however, one may infer
that this "Coke of American military law" knew of no American
cases.
The focus of this article is on the role of the legal system6 in resolv-
ing disputes regarding the accommodation of religious beliefs in the
armed forces. Generally, these disputes arise when an individual's
religious sensibilities7 make claims upon his conscience that cannot be
reconciled with the demands imposed by military discipline.
Although the believer may simply refuse to serve, 9 a more difficult
5. See generally C. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN(1869); W. HOUGH,
PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW (1855).
6. "Legal system" as used throughout this paper, refers to H.L.A. Hart's proposition, put
forth in The Concept of Law (1961), that within the general system of social rules there is a
class of obligations differentiated by the fact that they make certain conduct obligatory, and
that this obligation is enforceable by official power. The proposition seems self evident, but we
will see that the military has defined their legal system in a way which excludes all adjudica-
tory (and coercive) functions which do not fall within the powers exercised by court-martial.
To the extent that disputes arise outside of the legal system they are unreported and unknown,
even though they are decided by persons exercising a judicial role. Judicial rule has been
defined as:
the role of any person or persons or group of persons or organized group of groups of
persons, and any person(s) belonging to such group(s) who for any reason -
(a) have a duty to pass judgment on any disputed or disputable complaints of wrongdo-
ing made to them, with or without limit as to subject matter;
(b) have a duty to make their judgement by reference to standards of right and wrong
conduct whose existence as standards is not determined by their own present choice
or decision, except in so far as they must interpret or extrapolate from existing stan-
dards in justifying their decision.
(c) have a monopoly over the justified use of force in a human society, by the standards
prevalent in that society.
N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 113 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
7. Religious sensibility has been defined as, "The intellectual and affective perception
which an individual or community has of the relationship between religious experience and the
various dimensions of life." Chinninci, New Religious Movements and the Structure of Reli-
gious Sensibility, in UNDERSTANDING THE NEW RELIGIONS 26, 29 (J. Needleman & G. Baker
eds. 1978).
8. "Discipline" in this context has two quite distinct meanings. It may refer to an exter-
nalized system of codified rules and regulations demanding obedience to one's superiors (a
vertical relationship) and enforced by sanctions including discharge or imprisonment. Disci-
pline may also refer to an informal and internalized system of controls in which one's peers (a
horizontal relationship) and ultimately, one's conscience, inhibit infractions. See S. STOUFFER,
E. SUCHMAN, L. DEVINNEY, S. STARR & R. M. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER:
ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 410-11 (1949). The distinction, rarely drawn by the legal
system, has an important effect on a court's perception of the religious accommodation
problem.
9. See, e.g., McIntosh, Because Their Conscience Tells Them So (Conscientious Objectors
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problem arises when the military believer does not or cannot claim
the status of a conscientious objector,"° but seeks legal protection for
his religiously motivated behavior while remaining in the service.
Such a claim of protection may be asserted in either the military or
civilian legal system.
Basically, the legal principles upon which these systems rely in ad-
judicating such claims can be envisaged as forming a double helix.
Although both strands of principles are derived from the Constitu-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a
doctrine which links the two by simultaneously accommodating the
individual rights of the service member with society's collective need
for an armed force whose response to authority must be immediate
and unreserved. This dilemma is inherent in any constitutional polity
which refuses to abjure civilian judicial control over the military."
This paper will examine the military and civilian strands separately,
comparing their synchronic development and observing that certain
trends in military jurisprudence could ameliorate the kind of
problems raised by a case similar to McCord's. Research suggests
that although instances of conflict between religious sensibility and
military discipline are not uncommon, such conflicts are raised and
resolved in the military without reference to the constitutional dimen-
sions of the conflict. In conclusion, the paper demonstrates that
neither strand of legal principles is responsive to the needs of either
the individual or society, and suggests that the federal courts are the
least preferred fora for adjudicating such disputes.
in the Service), 103 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 42 (Oct. 1977); Comment, God, The Army, and
Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALF. L. REV. 379 (1968).
10. Since there is no constitutional right to conscientious objector status, Congress may
specify the conditions which exempt the objector from military service. See Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (Act which conscripted persons who objected to specific war
constitutional); The Selective Draft Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (holding Act exempting
ministers from service and requiring service members of certain religions to perform non-com-
bat duty not repugnant to constitutional rights).
11. The British legal system has similar doctrinal problems with its treatment of martial
law. See Townshend, Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in
Britain and the Empire, 1800-1940, 25 HIST. J. 167 (1982).
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II. ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS DISSENT WITHIN THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. The Military Experience: Courts-Martial Before 1950
1. The British Tradition
In his statement that religious beliefs were not a defense to a charge
of disobedience of orders, Colonel Winthrop relied on English prece-
dent. Since Winthrop's rule remains in effect today' 2 through its in-
corporation in successive editions of the United States Manual for
Courts-Martial,3 it is appropriate to examine the English authorities
on which he relied. Hough's Precedents in Military Law, refers to two
incidents where religious scruples were offered as an excuse for dis-
obeying orders. The first arose on the island of Malta in 1823 when
two artillery officers, a lieutenant and a captain, were convicted for
disobeying an order to fire salutes as part of a Roman Catholic reli-
gious observance."' The officers were thereafter dismissed from the
military. When the officers sought subsequent Parliamentary relief
their case became a cause celebre. The commanding officer of the
British Army, the Duke of Wellington, who had previously affirmed
the sentences, voiced his opinion on the matter before the House of
Lords:
The regulation which is here complained of does not require Protestant
officers of the British army to attend the Roman Catholic worship.
There is no act of mind in all this: it is the performance of a mere duty
.... You are told that it is a matter of conscience; but I want to know,
my lords, whether an officer in the army-and if not an officer, any
other member of the army-is to be allowed to get rid of the discharge
of a disagreeable duty upon such a plea? If so, my lords, there is an end
of all discipline in the army.' 5
12. Manual for Courts-Marital, United States, 1984, Exec. Order 12473, pt. IV.,
14c(2)(a) (1984).
13. See, e.g., Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, Exec. Order 11476, 169b
(rev. ed. 1969); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, Exec. Order 10214, 169b
(1951); A Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928, Exec. Order 4773, 1 134b (1936).
14. The Maltese had voluntarily joined the British Empire ten years previously, and their
treaty contained an undertaking by the British that they would continue to recognize and
support Maltese religious practices. The Maltese were Roman Catholic, and in the 1820's, the
British populace were virulently anti-Catholic.
15. W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 117 (1855) (emphasis in original).
J.W. Fortescue makes no reference to the incident and speaks only once of any conflict be-
tween religious practices and military service. Writing of The Peninsular Wars, and the spread
of Methodism, he observes, "Wellington did not think it good for discipline that officers and
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Wellington appeared to be drawing a distinction between inward as-
sent and outward obedience. Such a distinction may have Biblical
precedent16 despite the fact that the Judaeo-Christian tradition cele-
brates the memory of those who refuse to make the distinction.17
Additionally, Hough relates an instance in which an officer in India
refused to go into the trenches on a Sunday."8 Although Hough does
not state whether the officer was cashiered, he makes his own position
clear:
Everyone must admit, that if an officer will refuse to obey orders, be-
cause they may be contrary to his religious belief regarding the Holy
Scriptures, he is unfit to remain in the army. The real Christian is that
person who does his duty to his sovereign and to his country without
demur. If his conscience be unsettled, he should quit the army at once,
and not unsettle the affairs military. 9
In England, officers served at the pleasure of the Crown, not under
contract, and could sell their commissions.2 ° In this regard, Hough's
non-commissioned officers should assemble to listen to the exhortations of privates; nor even
that regimental officers should openly rebuke sins to which their superiors might visibly and
demonstrably be prone." X J. W. FORTESCUE, A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY 199
(1910). There is evidence of soldiers in 1740 "who hired a room for prayer and preaching".
Neuberg, The British Army in the Eighteenth Century, 61 J. Soc. ARMY HIST. RES. 39, 45
(1983). Common worship and its effect on discipline was to be the subject of two American
cases. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985); Bridges v. Davis, 443 F.2d
970 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 919 (1972); see also United States v. Johanns, 20
M.J. 155 (AFCMR 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 147, 88 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1985).
16. See 2 Kings 5. Naaman, a Hebrew, was commander of the army of the King of Aram,
who worshiped Rimmon. The prophet Elisha cured Naaman's leprosy. Although Naaman
vowed never again to make burnt offerings and sacrifices to another god, he asked forgiveness
for one thing: "When my master enters the Temple of Rimmon, and he is leaning on my arm
and I bow there also -when I bow down in the Temple of Rimmon, may the Lord forgive your
servant for this." Id. at 18. Cf Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (concluding that
it is constitutionally permissible to regulate religiously motivated behavior, without interfering
with religious belief).
17. See, e.g., Daniel 3. The Hebrews, Shadrach and his companions, who were royal
officials, refused to worship an image set up by their monarch, Nebuchadnezzar.
18. See W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 117-118 (1855). But see MANUAL
OF MILITARY LAW 12 (HMSO 1914) (officer cannot plead conscientious scruples as justifying
refusal to go into trenches on Sunday).
19. W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 118 (1855) (footnotes omitted); see also
Foreman, Religion, Conscience and Military Discipline, 52 MIL. L. REV. 77, 78 (1971) (misat-
tributing quote to Wellington).
20. See Dickson v. Viscount Combermere, 176 Eng. Rep. 236 (Q.B. 1863); In re Poe, 110
Eng. Rep. 942 (K.B. 1833); A. BRUCE, THE PURCHASE SYSTEM IN THE BRITISH ARMY, 1660-
1871 (1980). See generally Nettheim, Do Members of the Armed Forces Have Any Rights in
Their Employment?, 5 FED. L. REV. (Austl.) 200, 218-27 (1973).
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advice was both practical and practicable. One wonders, however, if
he would have granted scrupulous enlisted men the same right.
The other authority on which Winthrop, and thus all subsequent
American military lawyers, relied is Charles M. Clode, a former Solic-
itor of the War Department, whose Military Forces of the Crown 21 is
the single most important source of British military legal history.
Clode, in his discussion of the limits of obedience, begins with the
premise that every order not obviously improper or against the law
must be obeyed. He offers as an example the case of Captain Atchi-
son, where an officer refused to salute in honor of a Saint of the Ro-
man Catholic Church. For this act of disobedience, the Duke of
Wellington dismissed the officer from the military.22 Clode too must
be describing the incident in Malta, since Hough refers to one of the
two officers involved as a "Captain A _.,,23 Clode used the case to
illustrate the two views held by members of Parliament of what
should have been the officers' response: that the officers should have
obeyed the order, and sought redress afterwards, and that the officers'
behavior did not warrant court-martial.24 While Parliament was will-
ing to debate the wisdom of the military decision to court-martial
Atchison, no thought was given to the possibility that the sovereign
would be asked to reinstate him because his religious freedoms had
been infringed. Furthermore, the judiciary would not have intervened
even if Atchison had sought judicial review of his dismissal. This is
due to the fact that in 1792, Lord Loughborough, speaking for the
High Court of Justice, refused to issue a writ of prohibition re-
straining the execution of a court-martial. 25 While Loughborough ac-
knowledged that the High Court had jurisdiction, he declined to
exercise it for a "mere error in the proceedings." 26 From this premise,
we will see that the American judiciary, while asserting the right to
review disciplinary actions, has given similar deference to military
authorities.
21. See generally C. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN (1869).
22. See id. at 66.
23. W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 115 (1855).
24. See C. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN (1869).
25. See Grant v. Gould, 126 Eng. Rep. 434 (C. P. 1792).
26. Id. at 454. But see In re Mansergh, 121 Eng. Rep. 764 (K.B. 1861) (court refused, on
discretionary grounds, to issue writ of certiorari to Judge Advocate General in order to quash
court-martial); see also Rex v. Suddis, 102 Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1801) (court held that return
to writ of habeas corpus involving soldier was sufficient if it stated that prisoner was in custody
under sentence of court-martial competent to pass the sentence).
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2. American Military Justice Before the Uniform Code of
Military Justice
Prior to 1951, military appellate decisions were not routinely pub-
lished.27 Therefore, in order to locate any military decisions, the re-
searcher must rely on the periodic publications of the Army's Judge
Advocate General.28 Only one case involving religious scruples was
found in this source: that of a Second Lieutenant in the Army Air
Corps who became a convert to the Church of the Assembly of God.
In 1945, the officer was court-martialed for refusing to continue flight
training because his religious convictions prohibited him from risking
the possibility of bombing civilians. Relying on the provisions of par-
agraph 134b of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial,29 an Army
Board of Review confirmed the officer's sentence to discharge and
confinement for one year.30 Because this and subsequent courts-mar-
27. "Boards of Review" had been established within the Army in 1918 by General Order
and by Congress in 1920. See Act of June 3, 1916, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 799 (1920), repealed by Act
of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 638 (1948). Air Force boards were established in 1947; the
Navy did not establish Boards of Review until 1951. See generally Currier & Kent, The
Boards of Review of the Armed Services, 6 VAND. L. REV. 241 (1953); Fratcher, Appellate
Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. REV. 15 (1949). These boards (subsequently
renamed Courts of Military Review in 1969) were composed of lawyers, usually judge advo-
cates appointed by their military department, to review for legal sufficiency all convictions of
general officers and those cases in which the accused received the death penalty, a dishonorable
discharge, or confinement in a penitentiary. Decisions of these boards followed the format of
appeals courts decisions and performed generally the same function although they were not
self executing. When the court-martial system was revised after World War II, Congress cre-
ated a Court of Military Appeals over all the services whose members were civilians appointed
by the President and subject to senatorial confirmation. See generally Willis, The United States
Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39 (1972). Until
Congress provided for certiorari to the Supreme Court from the Court of Military Appeals by
passage of the Military Justice Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983), courts established pursuant
to article III of the Constitution could not directly review courts-martial judgments. Court-
martial jurisdiction was subject to collateral attack, usually by habeas corpus, but also in a suit
for damages or equitable relief. See infra, Judicial Review of Courts-Martial.
28. Digests of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, 1862-68 and 1912-51; Bulletin of
the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, 1942-51; and Board of Review decisions
from the various World War II theaters of operations. The Board of Review decisions were
not widely distributed and, unless a decision was summarized in the Digests or Bulletin, it was
effectively unpublished. The Tork decision falls in this category and has never been cited in
subsequent decisions. See CM 283352, Tork, 55 JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL BOARD OF
REVIEW OPINIONS 73 (1945).
29. United States Army, A Manual for Courts-Martial 1928, Exec. Order 4773, 134b
(1936 ed.).
30. CM 283352, Tork, 55 JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL BOARD OF REVIEW OPINIONS
73 (1945). In view of the controversial nature of such cases, it is not surprising the British and
[Vol. 18:12331240
1987] RELIGIOUS NONCONFORMITY IN ARMED FORCES 1241
tial were decided by persons who were fully cognizant of the federal
decision interpreting the first amendment's free exercise clause,31 it
will be useful to first summarize federal judicial interpretations of that
clause before evaluating the military's application.
B. The Civilian Experience: Development of Free Exercise Doctrine
The first amendment to the United States Constitution was in-
tended to both ensure the free exercise of religion and to separate the
state from any established church. In 1878, however, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of a Mormon
for polygamy on the ground that the first amendment's protection ex-
tended only to religious beliefs, not religious practice.32 This distinc-
tion has gradually diminished, most noticeably in the case of Cantwell
v. Connecticut,33 in which the Supreme Court ruled that a state's
criminal prosecution of a Jehovah's Witness for acting in violation of
an ordinance prohibiting door to door solicitation infringed on the
believer's free exercise rights. More recently, the focus of judicial ac-
tivity has shifted from criminal prosecutions, where the first amend-
ment is used as a shield, to civil suits, where individuals claim that the
application of a government regulation will impair free exercise rights.
Commonwealth records regarding the separation of air crew members have disappeared so
that it is impossible to trace their treatment of flyers with ethical qualms. See McCarthy,
Aircrew and "Lack of Moral Fiber in the Second World War," 2 WAR & Soc. 87, 96 n.56
(1984).
31. See U.S. Const. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
32. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
33. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court maintained the Wellingtonian body-mind distinc-
tion, "the [a]mendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be." Id. at 303-304. The
Supreme Court continues to recognize the distinction. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983). See generally Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise
Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980). But see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). Professor Tribe states: "the real distinction must
be between laws that aim only at a religious aspect of conduct or seek to achieve a clearly
religious end, and laws that aim at a secular dimension of the subject matter either regulated or
supported." Id. § 14-8, at 838. To the extent the distinction (of secular purpose and secular
effect) is useful, it applies in establishment clause cases-those involving state support of reli-
gion, while the judicial criterion for free exercise cases-where state action affects religious
autonomy, is a determination whether the government has selected the least restrictive means
to achieve a compelling end. See id. § 14-10, at 846. Tribe assumes that lawyers (judges and
law professors) are capable of making the sort of cost benefit analysis required by the criterion,
even in cases involving national security. See id. § 14-10, at 855-56.
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In Sherbert v. Verner,34 the Supreme Court ruled that a Seventh
Day Adventist had a right to state unemployment benefits even
though her employer acted properly in dismissing her for refusing to
work on Saturdays. Moreover, in Thomas v. Review Board,35 the
same reasoning led the Court to conclude that a worker could not be
denied unemployment benefits, despite the fact that he voluntarily ter-
minated his employment because of religious ideals which prevented
his participation in the fabrication of armaments. The Sherbert deci-
sion articulated the legal criterion to be used in determining whether
an individual could successfully claim exemption from a government
regulation on the grounds that its application would interfere with the
free exercise of religion. The criterion is one of "strict scrutiny," re-
quiring the government to establish that the application, of an other-
wise lawful rule, to the particular individual claiming protection
requires a compelling governmental interest that cannot be furthered
by other, less restrictive means.36
The "strict scrutiny" test enunciated in Sherbert is clearly intended
to favor the believer asserting first amendment rights. The Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts have, however, applied less rigorous
criteria to regulations controlling prisoners,37 the power to tax,38 and
instances where Congress has exercised its war powers. 39 As a matter
of fact, until the 1986 case of Goldman v. Weinberger,4° no case in-
volving a service member's free exercise claim had been adjudicated
by the Supreme Court. Therefore, until 1986, civilian and military
courts had some latitude in deciding whether military status called for
the application of the strict scrutiny test.
34. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
35. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
36. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (application of compulsory education
laws to Amish parents).
37. See Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding prison officials'
refusal to allow ministers to worship with homosexual prisoners), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215
(1985); Phillips v. Coughlin, 586 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (initial procedures met
compelling interest test); Furqan v. Georgia State Bd. of Offender Rehabilitation, 554 F. Supp.
873, 878 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (rational basis test used to review prison regulations).
38. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (upholding social security tax on
persons working for Amish employer).
39. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 385-86 (1974) (rejecting conscientious objec-
tor's free exercise claim to veterans' benefits); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461
(1971) (rejecting conscientious objectors' challenges to statute which granted draft exemptions
only to individuals opposed to participation in all wars).
40. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
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C. The Military Experience: Courts-Martial Since 1950
As we have seen, the Manual for Courts-Martial prohibits the use
of religious beliefs as a defense to disobeying orders. It is not surpris-
ing that such a claim has rarely been asserted before military courts,
and that when it has, it has been rejected as contrary to military law.
The Board of Review opinions (no Court of Military Appeals deci-
sions exist on this topic) merit our attention as factual reports of the
type of free exercise problems that have arisen in the military justice
system and how the system handles them.
The first reported case, United States v. Morgan,4" involved an Air-
man Third Class who was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to
two and one-half years confinement after being convicted of refusing
to salute the American flag during a military ceremony. Reviewing
the conviction, an Air Force Board of Review rejected Morgan's justi-
fication that, as a Jehovah's Witness, he had a right to refuse based
upon the free exercise clause.42 The Board relied on McCord v. Page43
and the "military exception" provided by the Supreme Court in Board
of Education v. Barnette" which states that military personnel have
many duties and cannot claim many of the freedoms that are available
to civilians.45
The second reported military case, United States v. Cupp,46 also
arose in the Air Force. The accused, a Jehovah's Witness, received a
sentence identical to Morgan's for failing to report for duty on his
Sabbath, (Saturday) and for refusing to salute an officer. Relying on
Morgan and the provisions of paragraph 169b of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 which stated that religious
scruples were not a defense, an Air Force Board of Review rejected
Cupp's free exercise claim. Additionally, the Board rejected Cupp's
assertion that military authorities had a duty to initially submit the
case to the Department of the Air Force for administrative
41. 17 C.M.R. 584 (A.F.B.R. 1954).
42. But see Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (refusal to salute flag in
civilian context permitted, overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
which had permitted state to bar from its school system children of Jehovah's Witnesses who
refused to salute flag).
43. 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941).
44. 319 U.S. 624, 642 n.19 (1943).
45. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 n.19 (1943).
46. 24 C.M.R. 565 (A.F.B.R. 1956).
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:1233
disposition.47
In the third reported case, United States v. Burry,4" a Coast Guard
Board of Review affirmed the conviction of a seaman who, as a mem-
ber of the Radio Church of God, refused to work on Saturday, his
Sabbath. Previously, Burry's superiors had adjusted his work sched-
ule to accommodate his belief, but revoked his Saturday "liberty"
when they became short-handed. The Coast Guard Board, citing
Morgan, Cupp, and an unreported Navy Board of Review decision49
affirmed the conviction.
In the most recent decision, United States v. Haywood,5" the ac-
cused refused to wear an Air Force uniform because she had adopted
the Muslim religion which prohibits women from wearing tight-fitting
clothes. Haywood pleaded guilty to disobeying an order to wear a
uniform and received a Bad Conduct Discharge. The discharge was
affirmed by the Court of Military Review; however, the decision was
concerned solely with the issue of whether the trial judge erred in
describing the offense to the court.
The preceding cases are remarkable for a number of reasons. First,
there are only five decisions during a thirty-year period in which the
47. Since 1892, the military has had a system for administratively separating members of
the armed forces. The grounds for separation are either unsuitability or unfitness. See gener-
ally Comment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ. A Statutory and Equal
Protection Analysis ofMilitary Discharge Certificates, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 227 (1974).
The decision to discharge before expiration of the term of enlistment would satisfy Mac-
Cormick's criteria for persons exercising a judicial role. See N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART
113 (1981). Since 1948, there have been five types of military discharges: honorable; general
(now a "Discharge Under Honorable Conditions"); undesirable (now a "Discharge Under
Other than Honorable Conditions"); bad conduct; and dishonorable. The last two can be
given only as part of a court-martial sentence while the first three can only be given adminis-
tratively. The type of discharge granted is intended to characterize the quality of the individ-
ual's service and could affect eligibility for veteran's opportunities for both public and private
employment. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966
DUKE L.J. 41, 43-45; Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical
Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1973).
48. 36 C.M.R. 829 (C.G.B.R. 1966).
49. See NCM 66 0804, Minnix (1966). An enlisted man in the Naval Reserves, who
failed to meet training requirements and was called to active duty, refused to undergo the
induction physical examination or to wear the uniform because of his religious beliefs as a
Jehovah's Witness. He was convicted and sentenced to receive a bad conduct discharge and to
be confined for three months. The Board of Review rejected his claim that he was exempt
from active duty but reduced his sentence, saying: "Even though the accused is of no value to
the naval service and his separation from the service is indicated, the circumstances of this case
are such that a punitive discharge is not warranted." Id. at 4.
50. 19 M.J. 675 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984).
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United States military had an overall average annual strength of ap-
proximately two and one-half million persons. Second, three of the
five cases arose in the Air Force, which during most of the period was
the smallest of the three major services and relied solely on volun-
teers. Likewise, the Air Force is seen to be both the most technologi-
cal of the services and most devoted to the concept of "management"
rather than "leadership". One can only speculate why there were no
reported cases from the Army and Marine Corps, which are reputed
to have a more rigid and authoritarian system of discipline. There
are, however, two possible explanations: there are no other reported
cases because there were no other offenses, or there were other of-
fenses which were not reported. The latter explanation is more com-
pelling because only those cases involving a punitive discharge or
confinement in excess of one year are subject to review by military
appellate tribunals." We can therefore surmise that few disobedience
cases involving religious beliefs would be severe enough to require
military authorities to conclude that a punitive discharge or extended
imprisonment would be appropriate.52 Thus, the reported cases were
exceptional because military authorities had decided in each instance
that severe punishment was warranted. In other cases, the accused
would have received minor punishment and, if the behavior contin-
ued, as it did in Burry,53 administrative discharge would ensue. The
51. See 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1982). It has been estimated that, between 1962 and 1970,
Courts of Military Review acted on 6% of all courts-martial, while the Court of Military
Appeals acted on 17% of the cases reviewed by the intermediate panels. See Willis, The
United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39,
76, 189 (1972).
52. See 36 C.M.R. 829 (C.G.B.R. 1966). In Burry, the court mentions that the accused
had previously received non-judicial punishment under the provisions of article 15 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 815. See id. at 830. Punishment under this article
and its predecessor, Article of War 104, does not constitute a criminal conviction and is in-
tended to cover only minor offenses. The maximum punishment authorized is a function of
the rank of the officer imposing it. The offender may refuse non-judicial punishment and may
demand trial by court-martial. It has been estimated that "hundreds of thousands of article 15
proceedings occur each year." D. ADDLESTONE, J. KOLOSKE, L.M. MILFORD, K.D. SNYDER
& B. STOCHMAN, MILITARY DISCHARGE UPGRADING 4.3.2.2 n.56 (1982). Summary courts-
martial, authorized by 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 820 (1982) have jurisdiction to try enlisted personnel
for any non-capital offense but may not adjudge a punitive discharge or confinement in excess
of one month. Both sets of proceedings are administrated by non-lawyers, whose actions are
subject to internal legal review, but the results are never published. These non-lawyers satisfy
MacCormick's criteria for persons exercising a judicial role. See N. MACCORMICK, H.L.A.
HART 113 (1981).
53. 36 C.M.R. 829 (C.G.B.R. 1966).
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reported military cases do, however, suggest at least two conditions
which might give rise to a serviceman's suit in federal court: a court-
martial conviction, which may be attacked on the ground that reli-
gious beliefs were improperly disregarded; or a decision, of which the
serviceman seeks judicial review on the ground that it impairs his free
exercise rights.
D. The Civilian Experience: Judicial Review of Military Decisions
Affecting Members of the Armed Forces
The federal judiciary has traditionally drawn a distinction between
its function of reviewing court-martial proceedings and its role in
evaluating military administrative decisions. Since free exercise
claims can arise in either context, the premises for judicial review in
each case must be examined.
1. Judicial Review of Courts-Martial
At the time McCord v. Page54 was decided, the rules relating to
judicial review were simple and straightforward. Generally, a writ of
habeas corpus would only be issued if the military had no jurisdic-
tion.5 Claims alleging that the accused's constitutional rights had
been violated were routinely rejected56 because of the rule which
stated that a serviceman's constitutional claims could only be asserted
before a court-martial.5 7 This rule was applied until 1953 when the
Supreme Court decided the case of Burns v. Wilson. 8 In Burns, the
Court held that constitutional claims could be asserted in habeas
corpus proceedings. Furthermore, the Court stated that the appropri-
ate standard for judicial review was whether the military gave fair
consideration to the claim.59 The doctrine of exhaustion of reme-
54. 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941).
55. See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial
Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40, 43-44 (1961).
56. See Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922) (allegation that confession had been
extracted by duress held to be error in admission of testimony). But see Grant v. Gould, 126
Eng. Rep. 434 (C.P. 1792).
57. See Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
58. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
59. See id. at 144 (plurality opinion). But see Note, Military Court-Martial-Scope of
Review by Civilian Courts- Violation of Constitutional Rights-Kauffman v. Secretary of the
Air Force, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 84 (1969) (applying "Full and Fair" standard of judicial review
to decision of Court of Military Appeals).
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dies," however, requires the accused to postpone his attack until after
conviction and completion of military appellate review.
Moreover, the success of an individual's claim depends upon the
federal circuit in which the petition has been brought. While the
claim must be one of constitutional dimensions,6' there is a "relative
state of anarchy"6 2 among the federal circuits regarding both the
scope and standard of review applicable in such cases. Furthermore,
we will see that this confusion has had no effect on the military's in-
ternal handling of free exercise claims.
Members of the armed forces who have been court-martialed and
discharged might also collaterally attack their conviction by bringing
suit in the United States Claims Court under the Tucker Act63 for the
pay they should have received had they not been improperly con-
victed. In determining their eligibility for continued pay, the court
reviews the legality of the underlying conviction." In view of the re-
60. The doctrine was first applied to military courts in 1950. See Gusik v. Schilder, 340
U.S. 128 (1950); see also McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). In this regard, I disagree
with Professor Tribe's assertions that Schlesinger deviated from the traditional approach of not
requiring the individual to exhaust his military remedies. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 46, 47 (1978). Tribe's conclusion is consistent with the traditional
view of military status, see Lieber, The Supreme Court on the Military Status, 31 AM. L. REV.
342 (1897), and is based on his reading of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
O'Callahan, according to Tribe, is not a "status" case; however, it should be seen as an ana-
logue to Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). Cf Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.
355 (1971) (O'Callahan distinguished and collateral attack rejected because offense service
connected). But cf Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (Brooks distinguished and
plaintiff's tort claim rejected because injury service connected). In the author's view, military
status is a context, not a condition, and O'Callahan can be reconciled with its predecessors.
61. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
62. Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-
Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 88 (1985).
63. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(2), 1491 (a)(1) (1982).
64. Until 1964, the court of claims was the only forum available to persons seeking finan-
cial benefits from military service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1982) (previously amended by 78
Stat. 699 (1964)). The court of claims, however, did not have authority to direct restoration to
office or position until 1972. See generally Brenner, Judicial Review by Money Judgment in the
Court of Claims, 21 FED. B.J. 179 (1961); Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status,
72 YALE L.J. 1293 (1963); Philos, Suits in the Court of Claims Involving Status-A Dilemma, 16
FED. B.J. 103 (1956). It may be that the court of claims was more generous in its treatment of
service members' claims where the service member had been treated unfairly by military tribu-
nals. For examples of court-martial convictions, see Juhl v. United States, 383 F.2d 1009 (Ct.
Cl. 1967); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. CI. 1966); Shapiro v. United States, 69 F.
Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947). For examples of administrative separations, see Clackum v. United
States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960). United States v. Augenblick casts doubt on the preceden-
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cent grant of court-martial review authority to the Supreme Court,
however, it is doubtful that the claims court will continue to collater-
ally review courts-martial convictions.
2. Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions
In any review of the federal courts' role in military personnel ac-
tions, it is appropriate to start with the most notorious case, Reid v.
United States.65 Reid had been a member of an all black unit sta-
tioned near Brownsville, Texas. Some of the members of this unit had
been suspected of terrorizing the town. When the soldiers refused to
cooperate with military investigators, the President, acting as Com-
mander-in-Chief, ordered their discharge "without honor." Reid's
subsequent suit for back pay was dismissed by the federal district
court on the grounds that the decision was beyond the scope of judi-
cial investigation.66
Three years later, in the 1911 case of Reaves v. Ainsworth,67 the
Supreme Court applied the same principle, by refusing to review the
Army's decision to discharge, rather than retire, an officer. The
Court stated that military law is due process for military or naval
personnel. Therefore, the decision of a military tribunal, acting
within its lawful powers, cannot be set aside or reviewed by the
courts. 61 In Reaves, the "tribunal" was a medical board of Army of-
ficers who concluded that the petitioner was unfit for promotion,
thereby subjecting him to discharge. In rejecting the petitioner's
claim, the Court explained why the normal standards of judicial re-
view were inappropriate in such a case.
The courts are not the only instrumentalities of government. They can-
not command or regulate the Army. To be promoted or to be retired
may be the right of an officer, the value to him of his commission, but
tial value of these cases. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969). Since 1972 the
court of claims has been authorized to issue orders directing restoration to office or position.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). The Court has set extremely strict criteria for exercising that
power. See, e.g., Casey v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 234 (1985); Guy v. United States, 608 F.2d
867 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
65. 161 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1908), writ dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 211 U.S. 529
(1909).
66. See id. at 470. Sixty-six years later the Secretary of the Army retroactively granted
honorable discharges to the 167 members of the unit, thus reversing the President. See New
York Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 48, col. 1; New York Times, Sept. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
67. 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
68. See id. at 304.
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greater even than that is the welfare of the country, and, it may be, even
its safety, through the efficiency of the army.69
Although agency administrative decisions were, by the mid-1950's,
presumptively reviewable by the federal courts, 7° Justice Jackson,
writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in Orloffv. Willoughby,7 I
maintained Reaves "military personnel exception" in strikingly simi-
lar language:
[Jiudges are not given the task of running the Army .... The military
constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judici-
ary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as
the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.
7 2
While the Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed that members of
the armed forces were protected by the Constitution,73 the distinction
between the constitutional rights of the soldier and the civilian contin-
ues to be made by the Court74 when it is called upon to review mili-
tary judgments relating to "the handling of men."' 75  This distinction
is presumably based on the fact that judicial review would interfere
with the "habit of immediate compliance with military procedures
and orders [which] must be virtually reflex with no time for debate
and reflection."' 76 Three factors, however, have limited this principle
of noninterference. The first is the Supreme Court's willingness to
69. Id. at 306.
70. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.07 (1958); see also L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 372 (abr. student ed. 1965).
71. 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (judicial review refused when inducted physician denied officer
status).
72. Id. at 93-94.
73. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181 (1962). But
see Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1958).
74. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
Uniform Code of Military Justice articles prohibiting conduct unbecoming an officer and gen-
tleman, and behavior prejudicial to good order and discipline). "The fundamental necessity
for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissi-
ble within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." Id; see
also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (rejecting constitutional tort claims of service-
men against their superiors).
75. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
76. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983). Compare the similar language used
by the Supreme Court nearly a century earlier: "An army is not a deliberative body. It is an
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as the right to
command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier." In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147,
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review the constitutionality of the statute on which the military relies
for its authority. 7 The second is the Court's willingness to evaluate
the statutory basis for the military department's action. 78  Finally, the
third factor is that the principle of noninterference gives inferior
courts the opportunity to apply a competing principle - that persons
in the military have constitutional rights, and the federal courts must
protect those rights. Thus, it should not be surprising that there are
literally hundreds of decisions rendered by inferior federal courts in
which the administrative "handling" of a particular "man" in the mil-
itary has been judicially reviewed.
Although there is no common legal thread to be found among these
decisions, some are nonetheless easily explained. Military depart-
ments are generally required to follow their own regulations if the
regulation is intended to benefit the individual service member 79 and
the individual suffered actual prejudice from non-compliance.80 Ad-
ditionally, there is a growing body of case law applying various provi-
sions of the Administrative Procedure Act8 l to matters involving "the
handling of men." 2 However, when military officials have acted
153 (1890). Grimley was cited with approval in the first "case of conscience." See McCord v.
Page, 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974).
77. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (no jurisdiction over current
soldier unless offense "service connected"); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955) (no jurisdiction over former soldier). Other statutes affecting the military have received
similar review. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute which required
spouses of female members to be recognized as military dependents only upon proof of actual
dependency held violation of due process). But see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)
(male officer's due process challenge of statute unsuccessful although statute applicable to fe-
male officers set more liberal standard for retention).
78. See Peck, The Justices and the Generals.: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Review
of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REV. 1, 66 (1975). Peck distinguishes two classes of cases.
See id The first class is, those cases where the action taken was in excess of the statutory
authority granted. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (characterization of
administrative discharges must be limited to service rendered and may not be based on pre-
service activities). The second class of cases are those where the service violated a statutory
provision. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393 (1961) (Army refusal to pay Korean
War turncoats must have some statutory basis).
79. See Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
80. See Bensing v. United States, 551 F.2d 262, 265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832
(1977).
81. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 & Supp. III)).
82. See Garrett v. Lehman, 751 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1985); Folk, The Administrative Proce-
dure Act and the Military Departments, 108 MIL. L. REv. 135 (1985); Haggerty, Judicial Re-
view of Military Administrative Decisions, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171 (1976); Lunding,
Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 YALE L.J. 33, 42 (1973).
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within the scope of their authority, courts had been reluctant to inter-
vene on behalf of an individual service member, regarding constitu-
tional claims such as a lack of procedural due process in actions
conducted by a board of officers. s3 Similar reluctance on behalf of the
courts has been evidenced in cases which involved challenges to as-
signments or the adequacy of training,84 unless the challenge is based
on an allegation that the military failed to adhere to the terms of an
enlistment agreement. 85 However, some courts have recently found
constitutional grounds for directing the reversal of military decisions
involving the separate treatment afforded service members.86
In Mindes v. Seaman,87 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that internal military affairs should not be reviewed
by a court unless there is either an allegation of constitutional depri-
vation, or that the military violated applicable statutes or regulations.
Further, the Mindes standard does not require all such allegations be
reviewed. Instead, when faced with allegations of misconduct, courts
must consider the policy reasons for nonreview. When considering
such policy, the following factors must be weighed: (1) the nature and
strength of the challenge to the military determination; (2) the poten-
tial injury to the service member if review is refused; (3) the type and
degree of military activity interference; and (4) the extent of military
expertise or discretion involved. 88
The Mindes test attempts to reconcile the legislative principle that
83. See Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539 (1947) (declaratory judgment and mandatory
injunction); Denby v. Berry, 263 U.S. 29 (1923) (involving mandamus actions); United States
ex rel Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922) (no jurisdiction to grant writ of mandamus);
United States ex rel French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922) (lack of jurisdiction to issue
mandamus).
84. See McDaniel, The Availability and Scope of Judicial Review of Discretionary Military
Administration Decisions, 108 MIL. L. REV. 89, 126-27 (1985); Sherman, Judicial Review of
Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV. 483,
529-33 (1969).
85. See Peavy v. Warner, 493 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (collecting authorities).
86. See generally Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1984).
87. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. See id. at 201; see also Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the
Military, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 397 n.57, 402-03 (1984). But see Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d
316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (declining to adopt the Mindes test). The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976), articulated a similar standard for collateral review of courts-martial. The test em-
ployed in Calley has not been accepted in the other circuits. See Rosen, Civilian Courts and the
Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 64 (1985).
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administrative decisions made within the military do not deserve spe-
cial consideration simply because they are made within the military 9
with the contrary principle that military decisions regarding members
of the armed forces merit special deference. Deference is given by
either defining the controversy as "nonjusticiable" 90 or by setting a
different standard for review."a Thus, in examining cases where fed-
eral courts have been called on to protect a service member's free ex-
ercise rights, one can expect the government to stress that the unique
character of the military calls for a special, constitutionally protected
regime, while the service member will emphasize the common consti-
tutional protections which all persons enjoy.
E. Federal Courts and Military Free Exercise Rights
After McCord v. Page,92 a quarter century elapsed before another
American serviceman appeared in federal court claiming that military
practices infringed upon his free exercise rights. In Geller v. Secretary
of Defense,93 a reserve officer sought to enjoin the Air Force from
enforcing a regulation which prohibited beards. Geller, a Jewish
chaplain, had served both on active duty and in the reserves from
1950 to 1974. Geller, had been wearing a beard since 1966, but was
not disciplined until 1973 when he refused to shave after being di-
89. See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945). "[I]t has been the undeviating
policy of the committee to deal with the types of functions as such and in no case with admin-
istrative agencies by name. Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, but not the
War or Navy Departments in the performance of their own functions."
90. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). In Gilligan, a request for judicial supervi-
sion of the Ohio National Guard's training was rejected on the grounds that the relief re-
quested would "embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the
Legislative and Executive Branches of Government." Id. at 7. Writing of Gilligan, Professor
Redish notes: "Let us assume that the National Guard training manual stated that blacks
were to be treated more roughly than whites or that any demonstrator professing a belief in
communism should be beaten. Surely, issues of military expertise and flexibility are irrelevant
to the constitutionality of such training." Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Ques-
tion", 79 N.W. L. REV. 1031, 1056 (1985). While Redish argues for "some meaningful [judi-
cial] review if only to provide a floor of constitutionally acceptable governmental behavior" the
extreme "rule making" example he offers avoids the more difficult problem raised by the single
soldier claiming an exemption from an otherwise constitutional rule, nor does he suggest what
criteria a court might apply to the government's assertion that application of the rule in the
individual's case was necessary for good order and discipline.
91. See Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(permitting warrantless inspections for drugs of servicemen's barrack space).
92. 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941).
93. 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1976).
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rectly ordered to do so. Because of his refusal, Geller was reassigned
to the inactive reserves. Geller asserted that his decision to wear a
beard was religiously motivated and, as such, was constitutionally
protected. While acknowledging that the military's concern in dis-
playing a common standard of appearance reflected a responsiveness
to discipline, the federal district court concluded that this reason was
not sufficient in this case because Geller was employed by the military
to specifically serve as a Jewish chaplain and he wore a beard for
seven years without criticism, adverse action or ill effects. Moreover,
in this case the court found no adequate justification for inflexibly
applying the Air Force regulations.94
The Geller opinion is remarkable in that Geller's status was consid-
ered to be that of a federal employee and not a military officer.95 This
may have been due to the fact that, as a chaplain, Geller was thought
to be outside the normal military chain of command.96 While not
constituting estoppel, the fact that immediate superiors had, for seven
years, permitted him to serve on active duty without complying with
the regulation, presumably evidenced the fact that the chaplain's
beard was not a threat to military discipline and efficiency.97
As a "free exercise" case, Geller was unremarkable; however, when
viewed as a decision involving the judicial review of a military admin-
istrative decision, it was unique. For the first time a federal judge
selectively exempted a member of the armed forces from the applica-
tion of an otherwise valid regulation.98 This result was achieved by
treating Geller as an employee, 99 and balancing his constitutional
94. See Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1976).
95. Cf Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 306 (1911) ("[tlo be promoted or to be retired
may be the right of an officer .... but greater even than that is the welfare of the country, and,
it may be, even its safety, through the efficiency of the Army").
96. An officer designated as a chaplain has rank without authority to command. See 10
U.S.C. § 8581 (1982).
97. See Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1976). But cf
Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginnsburg, C.J.,
dissenting).
98. See Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1976).
99. See id. In this regard, social science research and theory have been useful to the
military in recent free exercise cases. One of the fundamental themes of military sociologists
has been the institutional/occupational model of the armed forces. Setting up a dichotomy
between the two, researchers then identify biases towards one model or the other. See, e.g.,
M.L. MARTIN, FROM WARRIORS TO MANAGERS: THE FRENCH MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
SINCE 1945(1981); Janowitz, From Institutional to Occupational.- The Need for Conceptual
Continuity, 4 ARMED FORCES AND SOC. 51 (1977); Moskos, From Institution to Occupation,
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right to evidence his religious beliefs, with his employer's interest in
uniform appearance.
In 1980 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reached a totally opposite conclusion in a case factually simi-
lar to Geller. Sherwood v. Brown, 1" involved a Navy seaman who had
become a member of the Sikh religion which requires its adherents to
wear turbans. Soon afterward, the seaman was court-martialed and
discharged for failing to comply with the Navy's uniform regulations.
In his subsequent suit, the seaman claimed that the regulations were
unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court dismissed the
suit and the court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the govern-
ment had satisfied the "strict scrutiny" test by showing that helmets
were required of all naval personnel because of hazards in combat and
peacetime operations, and that no less restrictive alternative existed.
While the military's authority was affirmed, the court did so on the
narrowest possible grounds, the application of the "civilian strict
scrutiny test," and not on the principle that military judgments re-
garding discipline merited judicial deference.
In 1982, two more cases involving the free exercise rights of service-
men were decided in the District of Columbia. The first case to be
decided was Goldman v. Secretary of Defense,10 1 in which an ordained
rabbi challenged the constitutionality of an Air Force regulation
which prohibited his wearing a yarmulke (skullcap). The regulation
specifically prohibited both the wearing of any headgear indoors and
the wearing of any non-uniform items while in uniform. Initially,
Goldman had served for two years as a Navy chaplain, and three and
one-half years as an Air Force clinical psychologist during which time
his superiors permitted him to cover his head with either a yarmulke
or hat while on duty. When he was subsequently ordered to comply
with the Air Force regulation, Goldman sought relief claiming that
enforcement of the regulation would violate his free exercise rights.
Trends in Military Organization, 4 ARMED FORCES AND Soc. 41 (1977); vanDoorn, The Of-
ficer Corps: A Fusion of Profession and Organization, 6 EURO. J. Soc. 262 (1965). Clearly the
Geller opinion comes down firmly on the side of the occupational model. See Geller v. Secre-
tary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1976); see also benShalom v. Secretary of Army,
489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Army enjoined from honorably discharging homosexual
reservist).
100. 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
101. 530 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 734 F.2d 1531, reh'g denied, 739 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd sub. nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
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Prior to trial, the district issued an order temporarily restraining the
military from enforcing the regulation and ordering them to withdraw
a letter of reprimand which Goldman had received for refusing to
comply with the regulation. At the trial's conclusion, the court
granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the
regulation as to Goldman.
10 2
Before considering Goldman's subsequent history, it is necessary to
examine the case of Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense,1"3 also decided
in 1982. In Bitterman, an Air Force sergeant sought to enjoin the
enforcement of a uniform regulation which prevented his wearing a
yarmulke while in uniform. The district court held that the enforce-
ment of the uniform regulation was the least restrictive means avail-
able to accommodate the compelling government interest-the
effective functioning and maintenance of the Air Force. In its analy-
sis, the court relied upon the concept of a separate constitutional re-
gime for members of the armed forces expressed in Parker v. Levy "
and applied to the first amendment in Brown v. Glines.10" Since the
regulation was directed in furtherance of "motivation, image, morale,
discipline and esprit de corps [which are] essential to the efficient
functioning and operation of the Air Force," the court upheld the
regulation. 106
The government appealed the decision in Goldman and the trial
court holding was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. 10 7 The court of appeals concluded that:
102. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 29 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE(CCH) 32 (D.D.C. Apr.
26, 1982).
103. 553 F. Supp. 719 (D.D.C. 1982).
104. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
105. 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Army regulation requiring commander's authorization before
soldier could circulate petition on base, held not unconstitutional prior restraint of free
speech).
106. Bitterman v. Secretary of Defense, 553 F. Supp. 719, 724 (D.D.C. 1982) (drawing on
World War II military history and testimony of Air Force general who emphasized "horizon-
tal" effects of compliance with uniform regulations on other unit members). But see Goldman
v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 734 F.2d 1531, (D.C. Cir.
1984), aff'd sub. nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478
(1986). The affidavit, submitted by an Air Force general in the Goldman trial, emphasized the
effect of compliance on civilian perceptions of the military.
107. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd sub.
nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986). See
generally Note, Constitutional Law-The Clash Between the Free Exercise of Religion and the
Military's Uniform Regulations-Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 58 TEMPLE L.Q. 195
(1985).
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[T]he peculiar nature of the Air Force's interest in uniformity renders
the strict enforcement of its regulation permissible. That interest lies in
the enforcement of regulations, not for the sake of the regulations them-
selves, but for the sake of enforcement. Its regulations are necessarily
arbitrary. [T]he Air Force argues that it cannot make exceptions...
without incurring resentment from those who are compelled to adhere
to the rules strictly (and whose resentment would be intensified by the
arbitrariness of the rules), thereby undermining the goals of teamwork,
motivation, discipline, and the like; and that it cannot move the line, so
as to avoid the problem of making exceptions, without losing the bene-
fits of uniformity altogether. It therefore concludes that strict enforce-
ment of its regulations is necessary for military purposes. The Air
Force's judgment on this issue is entitled to deference because it is
within its expertise and outside ours.108
The view of the three dissenting court of appeals judges, however,
illuminates the paradox which military free exercise cases present.
The judiciary is obligated to protect constitutional rights and, if nec-
essary, determine when the needs of society must give way to the
rights of the individual. Federal judges, however, have no special
competence to judge whether the military is handling a particular
man properly.109 Some paradoxes can be resolved by identifying the
fallacy on which they are based. The problem posed by requests for
judicial intervention in military decisions regarding the handling of
men may give rise to an antimony which can only be resolved by re-
stating the premises which led to the paradox. 110
The Goldman dissenters began their analysis with the premise that
Goldman had a constitutional right to display a symbol of his reli-
gious belief. Free exercise cases in a civilian context require accom-
108. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984), (distin-
guishing civilian free exercise cases, on ground that states in civilian cases had no strong inter-
est in uniformity of application), aff'd sub. nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S.
Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
109. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
110. See generally Fletcher, Paradoxes in Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263
(1985). The nature of the conflict is illustrated by an exchange during the oral argument in
Jaffee v. United States:
The Court: [A]s I read the law, it doesn't matter if they stood up there and said, 'one,
two, three, left, right, left,' and marched them over a cliff.... You'd be protected under
Feres ... ? [Government Lawyers:] Yes, your Honor.
Jaffe v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 632, 635 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). Many writers have commented on this dilemma. See,
e.g., Note, Military Dissent and the Law of War: Uneasy Bedfellows, 58 So. CAL. L. REV. 871,
872 n.3 (1985) (presenting review of various authorities).
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modating those who desire to exercise their religious liberties, unless
it would be unduly burdensome.III The fact that Goldman had been
permitted to display a symbol without incident was seen as evidence
of the fact that accommodation would not be an encumbrance. Fur-
ther, the dissenters stated that the fact that a military commander
declared the display of a religious symbol intolerable suggested a cal-
lous indifference to Goldman's religious faith.' 12 Therefore, because
the dissenters' emphasis was on the individual rather than the institu-
tion, the Air Force, they had effectively substituted their judgment for
that of the military authorities.
The dissenters' approach was consistent with that taken in Ander-
son v. Laird,1"3 a case in which the court struck down regulations
requiring mandatory chapel attendance for students at the service
academies. Furthermore, the Anderson decision was consistent with a
series of prior Supreme Court cases explicating the first amendment's
purpose to build "a wall of separation between Church and State."' 14
In Anderson, the government was unsuccessful in attempting to estab-
lish that compulsory chapel attendance for officer candidates had a
secular and military purpose by inculcating sensitivity to the spiritual
needs of those who would serve under their command. In his concur-
ring opinion, Chief Justice Bazelon applied a "strict scrutiny" test,1 15
concluding that the government had not established that mandatory
chapel attendance was vital to national security, military operations
or disciplinary needs.
1 16
111. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr,
C.J., dissenting), aff'd sub. nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
112. See id. at 660 (Ginsburg, C.J., dissenting) (relying on Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952)). In Zorach the Court sustained a state program for released time for religious
education in public schools. "To hold that the state may not [adjust schedules], would be to
find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups." Id. at 314.
113. 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
114. See id. The phrase is drawn from a letter from Thomas Jefferson to a group of
Baptists. See XIV The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 281-82 (A. Lipsomb ed. 1903).
115. See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 296 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)
(relying on Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
116. See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295-96 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972). Judge Bazelon's view of disciplinary needs can be inferred from his opinion in Carlson
v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1335-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Judge Bazelon dissented from the
majority which denied a serviceman's claim that his first amendment right to free speech had
been unconstitutionally abridged when the military arrested him for circulating an anti-war
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If the military could not establish that mandatory religious obser-
vance was vital to national security or disciplinary needs, could it also
prohibit observance on those grounds? That question was raised and
answered in two cases in which military officials attempted to inter-
fere with an individual's right to worship. Bridges v. Davis, 7 focused
on worship at two Honolulu, Hawaii churches which had been desig-
nated by their pastors as sanctuaries for military deserters. Military
police thereafter entered the churches and arrested a number of
marines. The pastors who had organized the sanctuaries were ini-
tially given permission to visit the men in confinement. After a
number of incidents, however, the commanding officer withdrew the
pastors' permission to enter the post. The pastors challenged this de-
cision on first amendment grounds but were denied relief by both the
district and appellate courts. Both courts concluded that the com-
manding officer's decision was an appropriate exercise of military
judgment relating to good order and discipline.
In Ogden v. United States,II8 the court again addressed the issue of
military interference with a service members off-duty worship. The
commanding officer of the Great Lakes Naval Training Center was
informed by the Naval Investigative Service that the pastor of the
nearby Christian Fellowship Church had encouraged sailors to be-
come absent without leave (AWOL).119 Additionally, the investiga-
tion raised allegations that the pastor had solicited sailors to
participate in homosexual acts. In response to various newspaper ar-
ticles, and in light of the fact that the paster was under criminal inves-
tigation for sexual assault, the commanding officer declared the
church off-limits.
Members of the church thereafter filed a lawsuit seeking both in-
junctive relief and money damages for a violation of their first amend-
ment rights. The district court dismissed both the claims for money
damages and injunctive relief. The district court's dismissal of the
claim for money damages was affirmed by the court of appeals, 20 but
petition in Vietnam during combat operations. Bazelon's view encompassed only those aspects
of discipline which refer to the hierarchical relationship between subordinate and superior.
117. 443 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
118. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985).
119. See id.
120. Two theories of liability were advanced. The plaintiffs' constitutional tort claim for
money damages was dismissed on the ground that Chappell v. Wallace had concluded that
special factors dictated the inappropriateness of any Biven type remedy. Their civil rights
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the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief was reviewed in light of
the Goldman decision then pending before the Supreme Court. The
court of appeals reasoned that since the commanding officer's decision
involved a "core" liberty interest in worshipping God according to
the dictates of conscience,12 1 it was judicially reviewable. In review-
ing a claim for injunctive relief, the court stated that not only must
the service member's claim be one of constitutional dimension 2 but
the commander must be seeking the achievement of a legitimate mili-
tary end.'2 3 In this regard, a commanding officer's action will be en-
joined only if it is irrational, invidious, or exceeds what is necessary to
protect the governmental interest involved.' 24
At the time the Ogden decision was rendered, the Goldman case
was pending before the Supreme Court where, it was hoped, definite
criteria would be set for evaluating service members' claims involving
religious freedom. In affirming the rejection of Goldman's claim, the
Court concluded that constitutionally there is no mandate which al-
lows courts to abandon military decisions regarding dress. 25  Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices
White and Powell, emphasized that any judicial mandate to the mili-
tary, which would distinguish between permissible and impermissible
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were dismissed on the grounds that section 1983 applied only to
deprivations of rights perpetrated under color of state law. See, e.g., Norton v. McShane, 332
F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965). The appellate court held that their
claim under section 1985(3) was waived, thus it was not necessary to decided whether Chap-
pell barred the claim. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985). The
Supreme Court in Chappell had expressly refused to decide whether a service member's suit
seeking damages flowing from an alleged conspiracy of his military superiors under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) could be maintained. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n.3 (1983). Since
Chappell relied on the rationale in Feres, and subsequent decisions which turned on the threat
to discipline any "incident to service" suit would pose, there is no reason to believe that the
Supreme Court would create a conspiracy exception.
121. See Myer v. Nebraska, 260 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
122. See Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985).
123. See id. at 1179.
124. Compare id. at 1180 with Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F. 2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971).
125. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -_, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1314, 89 L. Ed. 2d. 478, 485
(1986). The Supreme Court's decision in Goldman will, in a civilian context, be seen as part of
a "new accommodation doctrine [which threatens] to allow governmental, majoritarian inter-
ests to override the interests of religious minorities." Teitel, The Supreme Court's 1984-85
Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least Resistance, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 651,
655 (1986). But see Ackerman, Church and State in the Supreme Court: The Non-Revolution
of the 80's, 33 FED. B.N. & J. 285, 289 (1986) (observing that Goldman majority abandoned
Sherbert and Yoder without offering explanation).
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behavior, would in actuality constitute a directive to discriminate
based on religious affiliation.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan reiterated the same arguments that
he had made while dissenting in Brown v. Glines.126 While acknowl-
edging that internal military decisions merited some deference, Justice
Brennan would apply an essentially "civilian" criterion to a service
member's assertion of first amendment rights. Such criterion would
require the government to establish a compelling interest. Moreover,
Justice Brennan responded to Justice Stevens' concurring opinion by
pointing out that the "neutral" dress regulation effectively discrimi-
nated against any orthodox Jew who sought to wear a yarmulke,
thereby presenting him with a "cruel choice."
' 127
Although the Goldman decision is not the focus of this article, inso-
far as it represents the Supreme Court's only statement regarding the
military's duty to accommodate religiously motivated behavior, it will
be looked to for the criteria used to adjudicate a service member's
constitutional claims. By refusing to accept or reject the standards
proposed in Mindes v. Seaman 128 and Ogden v. United States, 129 the
Supreme Court has simply restated the principle that courts will (or
should) defer to military judgments regarding the handling of mem-
bers of the armed forces. In their analysis both the majority and the
dissenting opinions began with the premise that Goldman had a con-
stitutionally protected right to display a symbol of his religious be-
liefs. While the majority accepted the military's judgment that the
cost of exercising that right exceeded the benefits, the dissent relied on
the reasoning implicit in civilian free exercise cases, by insisting that
the military justify its judgment. In this regard, the Goldman decision
illustrates one of the shortcomings of an adjudicatory model for
resolving such disputes: "the initial focus on rights is . . . a serious
126. 444 U.S. 348, 367 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1320-22, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478,
492-93 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The term is drawn from Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) in which the Court upheld Sunday closing
laws. "Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his
religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think
no State can constitutionally demand." Id. at 616. Former Associate Justice Arthur
Goldberg, in an article commenting on the Goldman decision, took the same position. See
Goldberg, In Support of the Free Exercise of Religion, Christian Science Monitor, May 12,
1986, at 16.
128. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
129. 758 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1985).
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impediment to the analysis of costs, for, in principle at least, if rights
exist they are not bounded by considerations of cost."' 3 ° Previously,
the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Board, 3' disregarded the ad-
ditional monetary costs imposed on the states when it ruled that ter-
minated employees should be eligible for unemployment
compensation. The majority in the Goldman case, however, was ap-
parently unwilling to disregard the intangible costs to morale and dis-
cipline which the government urged would occur if an exception was
made.
It may well be that even while the Supreme Court has affirmed ser-
vice members' constitutional rights in the past, the Court has refused
to set general criteria which would encourage federal courts to adjudi-
cate service members' free exercise claims. "Judicial deference" is an
epistomological stance, not an analytic technique: it simply discour-
ages judicial intervention. If that was the intent of the Supreme Court
in Goldman, then the resolution of such claims has been left to the
legislature and the executive branch. With this in mind one must now
examine if the Court has been successful in setting a workable stan-
dard for accommodation.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF FREE
EXERCISE IN THE MILITARY
Captain Goldman's case captured the attention of Congress in
much the same way that Captain Atchisons's had gained Parliamen-
tary interest one hundred and fifty years earlier. 32 For example, one
Congressman described the court of appeals' decision as being "offen-
sive to the basic Constitutional right guaranteeing the freedom of reli-
gion." 133 The Congressman thereafter introduced a bill permitting
the wearing of religious headgear in the military for a one-year trial
period. 134 Although the proposal was criticized, 3 ' the idea struck a
responsive chord in the Senate, which subsequently created a joint
study group within the Department of Defense to consider the prob-
lem of religious accommodation.136 The proposal ultimately became
130. D.L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 34 (1977).
131. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
132. W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 117 (1855).
133. 130 CONG. REC. H3568 (daily ed. May 9, 1984).
134. See 130 CONG. REC. H4836 (daily ed. May 24, 1984).
135. See id. at H4837-8.
136. See 130 CONG. REC. S7420, S7422 (daily ed. June 15, 1984).
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part of the Defense Authorization Act of 1985; 13 7 requiring the study
group to submit its report to the Secretary of Defense who would
thereafter report to Congress. The report, however, did not recom-
mend that any changes be made in current military practices.
In 1986, when Captain Goldman's case was adversely decided by
the Supreme Court, supporters of Goldman's position sought to in-
clude a provision in the Department of Defense Authorization Act of
1987 which would allow military members to wear "neat and con-
servative" apparel that is "part of the religious observance of the reli-
gious faith." The measure, however, was tabled by the Senate in a
fifty-one to forty-nine vote. 138 Similar language was also included in
the House Armed Services Committee's version of the current De-
fense Authorization Act and will, therefore be resolved in the final
conference report. Clearly, the proposal suffers from two obvious de-
ficiencies: it neither addresses other kinds of religious observance
which may conflict with disciplinary criteria, nor does it establish an
objective, easily ascertainable standard for commanding officers to
apply.
IV. THE EXECUTIVE RESPONSE TO CLAIMS OF
FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Donald Horowitz in his evaluation of the adjudicatory model, ob-
serves that courts have difficulty in judging how representative of a
problem a case actually is; if the case is exceptional rather than repre-
137. Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 554(a), 98 Stat. 2532. "In order to promote the free expres-
sion of religion to the greatest extent possible with the requirements of military discipline, the
Secretary of Defense shall form a study group to examine ways to minimize the potential
conflict between the interests of members of the Armed Forces in abiding by their religious
tenets and the military interest in maintaining discipline." Id.
138. See 132 CONG. REC. S10703 (daily ed. August 7, 1986). The legislation had origi-
nally been introduced in April, under the sponsorship of Senators D'Amato and Lautenberg.
See id. at S3785-86 (daily ed. April 8, 1986). Identical legislation, HR4525, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess., was introduced in the House of Representatives on the same day. During Senate debate
on the bill, one of its sponsors made a heartfelt statement which could have applied to Captain
Atchison's case a century and a half earlier: "it is a deep belief of mine that one can be a good,
loyal, determined soldier, sailor, or airman without at any time having to make a decision
between his belief and loyalty to his country and his belief and loyalty to his religions. They are
never, in my view, in conflict." Id. at S10703 (daily ed. August 7, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). Presumably most, if not all, of his listeners agreed, but we have seen many cases
where religious belief and the military definition of the requirements of a disciplined armed
force do conflict. His fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the problem illustrates
the legislature's ineptitude in attempting to resolve military free exercise conflicts.
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sentative, bureaucrats may not accord much legitimacy to the deci-
sion.139 So far, we have seen the paucity of reported cases involving
the conflict between military members' religious sensibilities and the
disciplinary system. If these reported cases represent "the problem,"
then judicially mandated exceptions should have no apparent adverse
affect on the combat capabilities of the armed forces.
In this section the focus will be on unpublished material describing
the kinds of free exercise conflicts military decision-makers have been
forced to adjudicate. The material is drawn from a variety of sources:
a Department of Defense Study Group Report citing a number of
unreported federal cases; 140 briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in
the Goldman case; a student paper, drawing on the files of the Judge
Advocate General of the Army;141 and internal records of the various
armed services made available to the public by court order.142 The
section will be in two parts, the first describing unreported cases in the
federal court system, and the second discussing incidents that were
resolved without recourse to the federal judiciary.
A. Unreported Federal Cases
In its report, the Department of Defense Study Group categorized
four potential areas of conflict and accommodation: rituals, particu-
larly sabbath observances; 143 dress and appearance practices which al-
low for visual identification of religious affiliation; 144 dietary practices
conflicting with food available in the military;14 and health-care atti-
tudes, specifically including beliefs in self-care and prohibitions
against immunization, blood transfusion, or surgery.'46 The report
refers to several unreported cases involving dress and appearance
139. See D.L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 266-67 (1977).
140. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY ON RELIGIOUS
MATTERS (1985).
141. See A. Squire, The Military and Religion: Concerns, Conflicts, and Accommoda-
tions (Dec. 1985) (unpublished manuscript).
142. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). See generally Kabatchnik &
Kabatchnik, Practice Before the Boards for Correction of Military Records Within the Various
Military Departments, 33 FED. B.N. & J. 17 (1986).
143. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY ON RELIGIOUS
MATrERS § II, at 2-3 (1985).
144. Id. § III, at 2.
145. Id. § IV, at 3-4.
146. Id. § V.
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practices. 147 For example, one case involved the application of an Air
Force regulation prohibiting beards to a Jewish chaplain in the Air
147. See id. § I, at 13. One case discussed by the Study Report was Guru San Singh
Khalasa v. Weinberger. See id. Khalasa involved a suit by a potential enlistee whose religious
practices made him ineligible for enlistment. The federal district court dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit's opinion affirming the result in Khalasa
is of especial interest in that it summarizes the Army's various treatments of members of the
Sikh religion. See Khalasa v. Weinberger, 779 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985). Conscripted Sikhs
were granted exemptions between 1958 and 1974. The draft ceased in 1973 and the exemption
was extended to Sikhs who had voluntarily enlisted until 1981, when it was terminated. We
could assume that some religious sensibilities of Sikhs serving in the military were offended by
this change in policy, but there are no reported Army cases involving active-duty Sikhs af-
fected by the change. The author of an unpublished student paper, relying on Army files,
stated that "[tlhe 25 Sikhs granted previous exemptions were permitted to stay in the Army
subject to assignment restrictions which would not jeopardize their safety." See Squire, The
Military and Religion: Concerns, Conflicts, and Accommodations 44 (Dec. 1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript). The Army's original decision to exempt conscripted Sikhs may have been
based on their reputation as exceptional fighting men. The decision in 1974, after the draft had
ended, to grant the same exemption to voluntarily enlisted Sikhs was, however, based on the
rationale that the Army would exempt a member of any religious group which set unwaivable
appearance requirements. At the time, Army officials thought that Sikhs were the only reli-
gious group with such a requirement. See id. Subsequently some Christian sects, other Mos-
lems, Hindus, Jews, Rastafarians, and Native Americans sought similar exemptions.
Exemptions for members of these groups were denied. When the Army directed that no fur-
ther Sikh exemptions be granted, it offered a number of rationales: the Soviet's chemical war-
fare capability had increased to such an extent that members had to be able to wear protective
clothing which was air tight, and considerations of uniformity, discipline, and esprit de corps.
See id. (summarizing an undated memorandum prepared for correspondents at time decision
was announced). The Navy's treatment of Sikhs is discussed in Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d
47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). There is no indication that the Khalasa court
was aware of the Army's action. Should the Army's decision have affected the court's judg-
ment? When Goldman's prior commanders waived the dress regulation they were acting ultra
vires; the Sikhs were granted permission by proper authorities. The Khalasa decision might
well have been unaffected, since courts have held that potential enlistees have no constitutional
right to enlistment. See, e.g., Niezner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1022 (1982) (applying Mindes v. Seman test to constitutional claims of age discrimination and
concluding claim was nonreviewable). If a serviceman, who later on active duty became a
convert to the Sikh faith, claimed an exemption and was denied, it was because the Army
decided that twenty-five Sikhs could be accommodated but that additional converts should be
discouraged. In light of such action, would a federal court enjoin enforcement of the regula-
tion? Normally, it would defer to military judgment, but if exemptions had been made by the
military, the court might well conclude that the incremental cost to morale and discipline was
outweighed by the benefit to the convert. However, the Joint Service Study lists some of the
other (potential) religion-based dress and appearance deviations: "swords, ankle length skirts,
dreadlocks (long braided hair worn by Rastafarians) and kum kurs (red dots worn on the
forehead by Hindus). See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY
ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS § I, at 24. It does not list those aspects of dress and appearance
associated with Orthodox Judaism which, as we have seen previously, have offered a fertile
ground for litigation.
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Force Reserves. 48 The chaplain sought an exception to the regula-
tion in order to train and serve with the active force. The suit, how-
ever, was subsequently dismissed.
The Department of Defense report also refers to another case, Shy
v. Alexander'49 which involved a Shiloh-Christian who refused to sa-
lute either the flag or female officers. After the Army refused to ac-
commodate his claim, Shy's case was dismissed by the federal district
court. 150 In addition to the cases already discussed, the government's
brief in Goldman refers to three other religious-based cases which
were also dismissed by the courts.15' Presumably, these were all the
lawsuits known to the Department of Justice. The government's
brief, however, also included a poignant letter from the pastor of a
United Pentacostal Church near Fort Riley, Kansas, in which he
named fifty-one men and women who had been administratively dis-
charged from the Army because of their religious convictions.
52
Thus one pastor knew of far more incidents of conflict between reli-
gious sensibilities and military discipline, than all of the cases con-
tained in legal reporters. The letter clearly suggests that the problem
is of far greater magnitude than the official reports indicate. More-
over, the letter reinforces the thesis advanced earlier that most relig-
iously motivated behavior which conflicts with military discipline
results in relatively minor unrepqrted punishment followed by admin-
istrative discharge.
B. Unreported Military Cases
The plausible pattern of dissent and discharge is difficult to demon-
strate because the armed forces do not maintain statistical records
which show the reasons for administrative discharge. Various Con-
gressional reports have estimated the yearly number of administrative
148. See Kalinsky v. Secretary of Defense, Civ. No. 78-17 (D.D.C. June 25th, 1979); see
also Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion, 98 MIL. L. REV.
53, 84-85 (1982) (quoting from the slip opinion).
149. No. CV-LV-84-141-RDF (D. Nev. May 31, 1984).
150. See Brief for Respondents at 44 n.26, Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct.
1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
151. See id. (citing Bitterman v. Weinberger, No. 83-3288 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 1984) (beard
and yarmulke); Kirschenbaum v. Secretary of Defense, No. 84-1302 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 1984)
(yarmulke); Taylor v. Alexander, No. C-1-80-417 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 22, 1980)).
152. Letter from Pastor Leonard Westberg to Senator Aspin and the Honorable Casper
Weinberger (Sept. 28, 1984), reprinted in Brief for Respondents at app. 2a-3a, Goldman v.
Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
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discharges to be in the thousands.'53 There is, however, one potential
source of information. Since 1942, over three million "Less than
Honorable Discharges" have been issued by the armed forces.'5 4 A
Discharge Review Board for each service was established in 1944'55
and two years later, in 1946, a Board for the Correction of Military
Records was created. 5 6 In 1977, as the result of a class action suit
brought by a group of veterans, the Department of Defense agreed to
publish and index these Board decisions. 15 7 Acting on the hypothesis
that some religious believers had been less than honorably dis-
charged,' 58 the twenty-one Marine Corps, one hundred twenty Army,
and sixteen Navy cases which were indexed as containing an issue
relating to religious discrimination were reviewed.
The outcome of the review produced mixed results. Many of the
opinions indexed as containing a religious discrimination issue did not
contain any such reference; others containing the allegation, often
combined it with an allegation of racial discrimination, without con-
taining sufficient facts to enable the reader to determine the exact na-
ture of the discrimination. 1 9 Only thirty-eight decisions (twenty four
153. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 496, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. REP. No. 388, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
154. See D. ADDLESTONE, J. KOLOSKE, L.M. MILFORD, K.D. SNYDER & B. STICHMAN,
MILITARY DISCHARGE UPGRADING 1.1 (1982).
155. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
156. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). See generally Kabatchnik &
Kabatchnik, Practice Before the Boards for Correction of Military Records Within the Various
Military Departments, 33 FED. B.N. & J. 17 (1986).
157. See Urban Law Inst. of Antioch College, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 4 Mil L. Rep.
(Pub. L. Educ. Inst.) 6012 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1977) (stipulation of dismissal). Subsequently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (e), required the Boards to provide a full statement of reasons
when they denied a request. See Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594, 600
(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1979); Wood v. Secre-
tary of Defense, 496 F. Supp. 192 (D.D.C. 1980).
158. Boards for the Correction of Military Records can also recharacterize the reason
given for an Honorable Discharge, but it was assumed that most discharge review cases would
involve upgrading, that is, an effort to seek a more favorable characterization of the individ-
ual's service. That proved to be the case. It has been alleged that these codes have adversely
affected some individuals. See D. ADDLESTONE, J. KOLOSKE, L.M. MILFORD, K.D. SNYDER
& B. STOCHMAN, MILITARY DISCHARGE UPGRADING $ 7.7.2.1 (1982).
159. Unlike judicial opinions, the board decisions were not intended to have any prece-
dential value. Instead, the opinions were intended to serve solely as an internal record of the
board's review of the veteran's allegations and as justification for their decision in order to
satisfy the stipulation of dismissal in the Urban Law Institute case that "[i]f not otherwise
listed in the statement of findings, conclusions, and reasons, a list of contentions and/or issues
of fact, law or discretion presented by the applicants will be made public with the decision."
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percent of the total) contained enough information for an analysis.
This sample, which involves discharges issued between 1945 and
1983, is far too small to offer anything more than a series of vignettes
illustrating some of the ways in which religious sensibilities may cre-
ate conflict in the military. These unreported incidents, summarized
in the appendix, do, however, suggest that the cases reported in the
federal and military court-martial systems are not representative of
the kinds of problems which arise. The cases were evaluated by con-
sidering the kind of remedy which authorities-military, legislative,
or judicial-would have been called on to grant in order to accommo-
date the applicant's religious belief. In evaluating the cases, one may
rely on the model of a remedial continuum devised by Peter
Schuck, 16 ° which is based on a scale of judicial intrusiveness ranging
from the relatively non-intrusive remedy of a declaratory judgment, to
the most intrusive, "structural" injunction where the judge orders
change in an institution's behavior.
Nearly one-half of the cases involved some aspect of conscientious
objection to the use of military force. Of these fifteen cases, one161
may not have been religiously motivated and falls outside of our study
of religious dissent.1 62 Since the terms and conditions of enlistment
are within the competence of Congress, the remaining fourteen cases
were analyzed to determine whether they could have been resolved by
a legislative change. In those where the serviceman had not followed
the procedure for requesting conscientious objector status, 163 or be-
came impatient with bureaucratic delays in processing his request"M
Urban Law Inst. of Antioch College, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 4 Mil. L. Rep. (Pub. L.
Educ. Inst.) 6012, 6013 5A (4)(a) (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1977) (stipulation of dismissal). The
Board decision might include a predecision brief, prepared by the Board's staff, intended to
familiarize the Board with the applicant's service and health record, and an evaluation of the
extent that these confirmed the applicant's allegations. The copies made available to the public
have been edited to conform with Privacy Act requirements.
160. See P.H. SHUCK, SUING THE GOVERNMENT 14 (1983).
161. See 1958 Army 7. For an explanation of the citation, see the Introduction to the
Appendix.
162. It has been suggested that religious criteria for conscientious objector status be elimi-
nated. See Childress, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, in CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUN-
TEERS 148, 151 (R.K. Fullinwinder ed. 1983). Until 1965, conscientious objector status would
be granted to only those inductees whose religion prohibited participation in all wars. How-
ever, the Supreme Court in 1965 extended the exemption to those non-believers whose beliefs
were sincere and meaningful. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
163. See 1945 Army 1; 1946 Army 3; 1974 Army 16.
164. See 1975 Marine Corps 2.
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and went AWOL without waiting for an answer, no legislative change
was necessary. However, in other cases where the applicant was not
eligible for classification as a conscientious objector,1 65 the outcome
presumably would be susceptible to changes in statutes regulating in-
voluntary service. It should be noted that in such conscientious objec-
tor cases the remedy sought by the service member was a release from
service, and not accommodation within the armed forces. Thus, Con-
gress is confronted with two related, but independent, legislative
problems: setting criteria for excusing potential inductees from ser-
vice; and setting the standards for releasing enlistees whose religious
beliefs have either changed during service, or are subsequently discov-
ered to be incompatible with the use of armed force. Because Con-
gress has not been asked to solve either problem the Department of
Defense can set its own standard for releasing enlistees.
The judicial rules for considering the claims of those seeking ac-
commodation within the system have not changed since they were
articulated in World War 11.166 The only judicial remedy available is
release from service by a writ of habeas corpus. As we have seen,
such a writ will be issued only when the service has violated the terms
of enlistment. 67 It is therefore probable that the criteria for accom-
modating religiously motivated in-service conscientious objectors will
continue to be set by the executive branch.
The remaining cases deal not with conscientious objection but with
the previously identified potential areas of conflict. The first, regard-
ing rituals, particularly sabbath observances, is reflected in a number
of the Board decisions.1 6 Typically, military authorities make some
effort to accommodate a service member until such accommodation
either conflicts with duty requirements or other members of the unit
complain of favoritism. 169 At that point, the commanding officer gen-
erally orders the believer to perform duties on the Sabbath. Accom-
modation of belief, however, still may be possible; other members of
the unit could be told that the respect for religious beliefs is more
165. See 1952 Army 5; 1967 Army 10; 1972 Army 13; 1973 Army 15; 1976 Army 17;
1977 Marine Corps 4; 1979 Army 21; 1982 Army 27.
166. See McCord v. Page, 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941); CM 283352, Tork, 55 Judge
Advocate General Board of Review Opinions 73 (1945).
167. See Peavey v. Warner, 493 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1974).
168. See 1956 Army 6; 1959 Navy 2; 1974 Army 16; 1979 Navy 6 and Army 21.
169. Compare 1979 Army 21 with United States v. Cupp, 24 C.M.R. 565 (A.F.B.R. 1957)
and United States v. Burry, 36 C.M.R. 829 (C.G.B.R. 1966).
1268 [Vol. 18:1233
1987] RELIGIOUS NONCONFORMITY IN ARMED FORCES 1269
important than equal treatment, 170 or the believer could be trans-
ferred to an assignment where weekends are observed. If accommo-
dation is to be achieved, it cannot be done by either the legislature
passing, for example, laws requiring military commanders to honor
the sabbath commitments of their subordinates or by the federal judi-
ciary. Thus, the state of the law regarding sabbath observance has not
changed since the mid-nineteenth century; 171 accommodation is at a
commanding officer's discretion and is reviewable only by superiors in
the chain of command.
The second potential area of conflict, dress and appearance stan-
dards, is more widespread, and therefore more serious than the De-
partment of Defense Study Group report suggests. This is due to the
fact that nonconformity relates not only to the rare nonverbal state-
ments of religious affiliation (the yarmulke, etc.) but also to other
common beliefs that certain types of dress are forbidden by some be-
lievers 171 or that one's faith requires unshorn hair. 173 To date, Con-
gress has never set dress and appearance standards. Furthermore, it
is clear that the proposed "test legislation" in the Defense Authoriza-
tion Bill1 74 which addresses solely "headgear" is not a solution. Since
the federal judiciary has proven to be incapable of doing more than
ratifying the military's regulations, only the executive branch can
make structural accommodation by changing regulations or allowing
exceptions.
The third potential area of conflict, problems caused by dietary
practices which conflict with the military's requirements for mass
feeding and combat readiness, is reflected in the Department of De-
fense report. 175 To date, however, the military has also been unre-
170. Justice Brennan, speaking on behalf of an exemption of yarmulkes, said that it
would serve as "an eloquent reminder [to other members of the Air Force] that the shared and
proud identity of United States servicemen embraces and unites religious and ethnic plural-
ism." Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S .... 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1319, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478, 491
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. See W. HOUGH, PRECEDENTS IN MILITARY LAW 114-15 (1855).
172. See, e.g., NCM 66 0804, Minnix (1966); United States v. Haywood, 19 M.J. 675
(A.F.C.M.R. 1984); 1982 Army 25; Letter from Pastor Leonard Westberg to Senator Aspin
and the Honorable Casper Weinberger (Sept. 28, 1984), reprinted in Brief for Respondents at
app. 2a-3a, Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -., 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1986).
173. See, e.g., 1981 Army 24; 1981 Army 26; Taylor v. Alexander, No. C-1-80-417 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 22, 1980).
174. See 132 CONG. REC. S10703 (daily ed. August 7, 1986).
175. See 1951 Army 4; 1980 Army 23.
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sponsive to standards of accommodation which have been imposed by
the judiciary or legislature in this regard.
The fourth and last area of potential conflict, health-care attitudes,
is represented by only one case in the report.' 76 The case dealt with a
service member who refused to be vaccinated. Since civilian compul-
sory vaccination laws have been upheld by the courts,' 7" it is doubtful
that any judicial or legislative effort to accommodate those service
members claiming first amendment protection from medical treat-
ment would be possible.
As the Study Group's potential areas of conflict are examined, it is
noticeable that two important topics were not discussed. First, there
is no mention of those cases 178 in which a service members' religious
beliefs precluded his participation in military ritual, for example, sa-
luting the flag. Presumably the report's authors concluded that no
accommodation was possible. There is no legislative solution for such
a case, short of removing the requirement for all service members.
Furthermore, a judicial solution would exist in only rare cases where
a court would be willing to exempt an individual service member from
the application of an otherwise valid regulation. As the system is
presently structured, the believer is obliged to make an accommoda-
tion because the law will not protect him.
The second area of potential conflict not discussed in the report is
religiously motivated behavior which, while not contrary to regula-
tion, diminishes unit cohesion, I9or horizontal discipline. Unreported
176. See 1967 Army 10.
177. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905).
178. See McCord v. Page, 124 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1941); United States v. Cupp, 24 C.M.R.
565 (A.F.B.R. 1957); Shy v. Alexander, No. CV-LV-84-141-RDF (D. Neb. May 31, 1984).
179. See Shils & Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wermacht in World War
11, 12 PuB. Op. Q. 280 (1948) (seminal sociological study of intra-group relationships in mili-
tary). Work on the topic continued in the aftermath of the Korean War. See, e.g., Little,
Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in THE NEW MILITARY: CHANGING PATTERNS
OF ORGANIZATION 195 (M. Janowitz ed. 1964). Cohesion as a measure of unit performance
became a major matter of concern during the Vietnam War. See Fowler, Combat Cohesion in
Vietnam, 59 MIL. REV. 22 (1979). The term has been defined as "the bonding together of
members of an organization or unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to
each other, their unit, and the mission." NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, DEFENSE MAN-
AGEMENT STUDY GROUP ON MILITARY COHESION, COHESION IN THE U.S. MILITARY IX
(1984). One author has concluded that "[clohesive units drawn from a heterogeneous society
are ethnically similar and share other major cultural characteristics or are integrated and so-
cialized to the extent that minorities are able to communicate effectively, share and adhere to
dominant secondary and primary group norms, do not form autonomous minority groups with
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cases exemplify numerous such instances. For example: a Catholic
mocked by barrack mates because of his evening prayers;IS° a soldier
whose religious beliefs made him "a loner";"81 and a Seventh Day Ad-
ventist whose shipmates said he was "weird."' I8 2 Such religious beliefs
are said to interfere with the bonding process which commanders and
military sociologists deem necessary for effective unit performance.
183
No legislative solution to this problem, other than exhortations to
"improved understanding" is possible nor are there any articulated
standards for an exercise of judicial power by injunction or declara-
tory judgment. Therefore, if a solution is to be found, it must be
found within the executive branch.
separate norms incongruent with army norms; are assigned by sex or by sex and function."
W.D. HENDERSON, COHESION THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN COMBAT 26 (1985). The military's
emphasis on instantaneous response in life-or-death situations, assigns a high value to unit
cohesion and "buddy relationships," and draws no distinction between front line and support
units. See, e.g., Bonds, Punishment, Discipline and the Naval Profession, 104 NAY. INST.
PROCED. 43, 48 (1978). Army officials might well conclude that religion based characteristics
adversely affected unit cohesion and might insist on compliance or discharge. Religious char-
acteristics are constitutionally suspect criteria meriting close judicial scrutiny, particularly "in
a setting characterized by institutional rigidity to change ... [and] when the legislative and
administrative processes seem systematically resistant to change." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31, at 1091, 1092 (1978). Both Professors Reddish and Tribe would
presumably expect a federal court to scrutinize closely the military's rationale in such a case
but neither offers criteria a court might use in its evaluation. While it must be said that neither
scholar has considered the problem of free exercise in the military, it is clear that classic "civil-
ian" tests will not work in a military context. Two church-state scholars were asked by the
Joint Service Study Group to comment on the problem. Professor Kurland concluded that
while the need for obedience and discipline was not an absolute defense, courts would likely
sustain a regulation affecting religious observance even though it conflicted with first amend-
ment claims. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY ON RELI-
GIOUS MATTERS app. at 50 (1985). Professor Pfeiffer warned of any denials of accommodation
which might be seen as predicated on hostility to a particular religion, and assumed continued
strict scrutiny by the courts. See id. app. at 75.
180. See 1946 Army 2.
181. See 1976 Army 18.
182. See 1979 Navy 6; see also 1976 Army 17 (harassment of conscientious objector).
183. See W.D. HENDERSON, COHESION: THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN COMBAT 26 (1985);
Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in THE NEW MILITARY: CHANGING PAT-
TERNS OF ORGANIZATION 195 (M. Janowitz ed. 1964); NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT STUDY GROUP ON MILITARY COHESION, COHESION IN THE U.S.
MILITARY (1984); Fowler, Combat Cohesion in Vietnam, 59 MIL. REV. 22 (1979); Shils &
Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wermacht in World War 11, 12 PUB. Op. Q. 280
(1948).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although our legal system requires public authorities to accommo-
date religious belief to the greatest possible extent, we have seen that
the specialized nature of the military institution discourages legisla-
tive or judicial review of the executive's decision regarding accommo-
dation. It is tempting to conclude that so few individuals are
represented in the cases reviewed that the military should be permit-
ted to continue their efforts at accommodation 184 without interference
by the other two branches of government. However, that temptation
should be rejected on two grounds. First, on the basis of simple jus-
tice. If we are, as a polity, committed to an ideal of religious freedom,
we should ensure that the legal mechanisms we have in place are
designed to accommodate that ideal.
Second, the temptation to leave matters as they are should also be
rejected on pragmatic grounds. In recent years, leaders of main-
stream religious groups have taken positions on public issues which, if
accepted by the adherents of their faiths, will create moral dilemmas
for believers within the armed forces. 185 Simultaneously, the growth
of "new religions '  outside the mainstream faiths has been marked
by an insistence on externalized behavior inconsistent with military
norms. A superficial utilitarian response-that the needs of the few
(nonconforming military believers) must give way to those of the
many (the citizenry's requirements for a disciplined armed force)-
fails to recognize that the pool of military manpower has declined
drastically and that the nation may no longer be able to afford the loss
of young men and women willing to serve in its defense who "do not
use drugs, alcohol, nor tobacco ... [and are] sincere, dedicated, [and]
184. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 1300.17 (1985) (dealing with ac-
commodation of religious practices within military services; issued as result of Joint Service
Study).
185. See Bernadin, Marty & Adams, The Role of the Religious Leader in the Development
of Public Policy, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1984). Presumably these leaders hope to influence
members of the armed forces. If members of the armed forces represent a cross-section of the
American population then ninety-two percent identify with Bible-based denominations, eighty-
eight percent believe that the Bible is the actual or inspired word of God, and seventy-five
percent read the Bible. See Nussbaum, A Garment for the Naked Public Square: Nurturing
American Public Theology, 16 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 53, 77 (1985).
186. See Anthony & Robbins, Spiritual Innovation and the Crisis of American Civil Reli-
gion, 111 DAEDALUS 215 (1982); Shepherd, The New Religions and the Religion of the Repub-
lic, 46 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 509 (1978).
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hard working."'18 7 Therefore, the traditional military solution of de-
fining the limits of accommodation, and removing the believer if those
limits are exceeded, may have already become too costly.
1 88
If a statutory solution is not possible, can the court system arrive at
criteria for identifying the exceptional case where judicial deference to
the military should give way to intervention to protect the believer?
The Goldman decisions reveal a bitter disagreement over the proper
response to that question, but most judges deem themselves incapable
of assessing the intangible costs of an individual exception to the mili-
tary system of discipline. In effect, the military claims an unchallen-
gable "knowledge mandate"' 8 9 which precludes a challenge by the
187. Letter from Pastor Leonard Westberg to Senator Aspin and the Honorable Casper
Westberger (Sept. 28, 1984), reprinted in Brief for Respondents at app. 2a-3a, Goldman v.
Weinberger, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).
188. The Department of Defense currently enlists about twenty-six percent of qualified
males (i.e. those eligible to serve in combat) from the available pool of eighteen year olds; that
pool is projected to decline in the 1990's and, if military manpower requirements (in terms of
numbers, gender, and test scores) remain constant, nearly a third of the pool will have to enlist
in the 1990's. See Rimland & Larson, The Manpower Quality Decline: An Econological Per-
spective, 8 ARMED FORCES & Soc. 21, 22 (1981). Surveys suggest that no more than a third of
eligible males (and thirteen percent of eligible females) have shown a propensity to enlist. See
Stephens, Retaining Citizen Soldiers, 8 ARMED FORCES & Soc. 471, 472 (1982). The services
may soon exhaust the pool of eligibles with a propensity to enlist. See generally Home, Model-
ing Army Enlistment Supply for the All- Volunteer Force, MONTHLY LABOR REV., August
1985, at 35. As Congress considers solutions-increasing incentives to enlist; decreasing entry
standards; or curtailing force levels-it should consider the effect of involuntary attrition on
requirements for new enlistees. Since 1973, approximately one third of all male recruits have
failed to complete their first terms of enlistment. See Faris, Economic and Noneconomic Fac-
tors of Personnel Recruitment and Retention in the AVF, 10 ARMED FORCES & Soc. 251, 257
(1984). We do not know how many of the enlistments were terminated because of the individ-
ual's religious practices. We do know that, at one army post, more than fifty enlistees were
separated because of their practices. See Letter from Pastor Leonard Westberg to Senator
Aspin and the Honorable Casper Weinberger (Sept. 28, 1984), reprinted in Brief for Respon-
dents at app. 2a-3a, Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S. -_, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478
(1986). In 1981, it would have cost between $13,000 and $16,000 to enlist each of their
replacements. See Baldwin & Daula, The Cost of High-Quality Recruits, 11 ARMED FORCES &
Soc. 96, 108 (1984). Costs increase dramatically when an enlistee is separated after his first
enlistment since six new enlistees have to be brought into the army in order to obtain one
careerist with ten years of service. See D.O.D. Defense Appropriations for F. Y. 1985: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Defense Appropriations, House Committee on Appropriations, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 7, at 425-26 (1985) (testimony of L.H. Korb, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower & Reserve Affairs). Congressional committees might well ask the De-
partment of Defense for an estimate of the costs of conformity. While concerning itself with
the intangible costs to cohesion if dissenting believers were retained, the OFFICE OF THE SEC-
RETARY OF DEFENSE, JOINT SERVICE STUDY ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS vi, viii (1985) does
not discuss the tangible manpower costs associated with their replacement.
189. The term is drawn from Halliday, Knowledge Mandates: Collective Influence by Sci-
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL
uninformed. Other professions may make similar claims regarding
their expertise, but only the military can claim that a challenge to
their internal authority can threaten their efficiency and thus the con-
tinued existence of the state. For example, in the Goldman trial, an
Air Force general submitted an affidavit claiming that exceptions to
the uniform regulations would have an adverse effect on civilian per-
ceptions of the military.19 0 The general's statement was not based on
any specialized epistemological base, but was simply an opinion which
the trial judge could accept or reject. When, however, in Bitterman v.
Secretary of Defense, 19' a general testified that an exception to the uni-
form regulation would have an adverse effect on unit morale, 192 the
general claimed a particular expertise which the trial judge could not
match. Not surprisingly, the court accepted the general's judg-
ment. 193  If military judgments regarding religious accommodation
are justified by relying on unit cohesion and obedience, most federal
judges will refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the military.
But this does not necessarily mean that the uniformed believer can
never claim civilian judicial review of the military's decision.
While religious nonconformity may expose the believer to court-
martial or non-judicial punishment, it must be remembered that reli-
gious scruples are no defense to a charge of disobedience of orders.
However, the legality of the order may be challenged, and the civilian
Court of Military Appeals has set a standard of reasonableness in
evaluating military orders. 1 Skeptics may doubt that a uniformed
trial court will conclude that an order is unreasonable, but there is no
doubt that the Court of Military Appeals has done so even when the
entific, Normative and Syncretic Professions, XXXVI BRIT. J. Soc. 421 (1985). It is used here
in the sense that the specialized cognitive base of professional military knowledge relating to
"the handling of men" legitimates commanders' professional judgments.
190. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1981). Justice
Blackmun's comments in Goldman differ with the general. Blackmun states that the Air Force
has not shown that they will suffer an image problem if they allowing exemptions. See
Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S .... 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1321, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. 553 F. Supp. 719 (D.D.C. 1982).
192. See id. at 724.
193. But see Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S..... 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1319, 89 L. Ed. 2d
478, 491 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed in Goldman that it was
wholly implausible that morale would be affected if yarmulkes were permitted.
194. "If an order imposes a limitation on a personal right, it must appear it is reasonably
necessary to safeguard and protect the morale, discipline, and usefulness of the members of a
command." United States v. Martin, 1 USCMA 674, 676, 5 C.M.R. 100, 102 (1952).
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government claims were based on considerations of unit morale and
discipline.1 95 Similarly, the Military Court of Appeals has involved
itself in the discharge process, by deciding that an individual should
have been released administratively rather than court-martialed.
196
Moreover, the court has even concluded that a commanding officer
may, by his behavior, lose the right to be obeyed even though he has
not been relieved of his command.1 97 Although this court has not
ruled on any free exercise cases, it has expressed its willingness to do
so. I" One may well question the degree of accommodation the Court
of Military Appeals might require in first amendment cases, but it is
clear that its judges accord far less deference to military decisions
than their counterparts in the federal court system.
It could, of course, be argued that in light of the fact that so few
free exercise cases proceed to trial and so few trials are reviewed by
the Court of Military Appeals,1 99 that any "liberality" by the court
would not affect disciplinary practices at the unit level. However, an
examination of complaints for redress of wrongs submitted under arti-
cle 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice2" shows that military
lawyers routinely reviewed these complaints and applied relevant
legal criteria in evaluating the commander's effort to accommodate
the particular religious practice.2"' Thus, the military's legal sys-
tem2" 2 has shown itself more capable than the civilian system in adju-
195. See, e.g., United States v. Wysong, 26 C.M.R. 29 (C.M.A. 1958) (rejecting govern-
ment's rationale that order telling suspect non-commissioned officer not to talk to members of
unit regarding investigation was intended to maintain unit's cohesive combat capability).
196. See United States v. Noyd, 40 C.M.R. 195 (C.M.A. 1968) (disobedience of orders
conviction reversed because accused had been wrongfully denied an administrative discharge
as a conscientious objector); cf Cole v. Spear, 747 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying reasona-
bleness test to military regulations giving precedence to disciplinary action under Uniform
Code of Military Justice before processing conscientious objector's application for administra-
tive discharge).
197. See United States v. Revels, 41 C.M.R. 475 (A.C.M.R. 1969), petition for review
denied, 41 C.M.R. 403 (C.M.A. 1970).
198. See United States v. Johanns, 20 M.J. 155 (AFCMR 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 147, 88 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1985).
199. See Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and
Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39, 76, 189 (1972).
200. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982).
201. See Army: DAJA-AL 1983/2556 (holding unreasonable commander's refusal of
service member's request for time off to observe religious holidays); JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN-
ERALI971/4987 (request to reverse commander's refusal to authorize preparation of Muslim
food denied as unreasonable).
202. Legal system refers to the proposition that within the general system of social rules
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dicating service members' free exercise claims. However, because the
military system is, at present, immune from disinterested external
scrutiny, its decision may therefore be suspect. The Chief Judge of
the Court of Military Appeals has suggested2 °3 that the court's juris-
diction be expanded to authorize judicial review of adverse personnel
actions affecting individual members of the armed forces. If the
court's jurisdiction were expanded, the reasonableness of any com-
manding officer's decision to administratively separate a soldier whose
religious beliefs conflicted with established norms would be evaluated
by civilians outside the system. °4
In this fashion, the antimony alluded to earlier requiring civilian
judicial review of matters over which the judiciary disclaims any com-
petence can be resolved by restating the premise that judicial review
must take place within the civilian court system. However, as long as
men and women believe that their transcendent obligations may con-
flict with the contingencies of life,20 5 intractable cases will remain. As
a society committed to both the ideal of religious freedom and the
demands of a disciplined armed force, we can only admire those he-
roic men and women who seek to reconcile the demands of two such
disparate masters. Chief Justice Stone wrote of those who refused to
serve in the armed forces:
[B]oth morals and sound policy require that the state should not violate
the conscience of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to
the view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value which
there is a class of obligations differentiated by the fact that they make certain conduct obliga-
tory, and that this obligation is enforceable by official power. See H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW (1961).
203. See Everett, Some Observations on Appellate Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 31
FED. B.N. & J. 420, 422 (1984).
204. The military's amenability to internal change, and its fear of external interference,
was the Court of Military Appeals' rationale for the Johanns decision. See United States v.
Johanns, 20 M.J. 155 (AFCMR 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 106 S. Ct. 147, 88 L. Ed. 2d
122 (1985). "Whether the Air Force abandons the custom [prohibiting fraternization between
officers and the enlisted force], tries to retain what now exists, or reclaim some of what has
been lost, let us do it consciously and with careful consideration. If we continue to drift we
will find that some cause celebre will arise between a firm commander and a determined officer.
The decision will then be made for us by someone with no experience in or regard for the
institutional values and character of the Air Force. Through ignorance or malice, such a deci-
sion maker could do serious injury." Flatten, Fraternization, 10 THE AFJAG REPORTER 109,
116 (1981).
205. See, e.g., Jeremiah 38:1-6, 8-10 (prophet imprisoned for demoralizing soldiers);
Luke 12:51-53 (Christian message that religious belief may be inconsistent with secular values
of cohesion and family affection).
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makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the state. So deep is its
significance and vital, indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and
spiritual nature that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state
should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the
state which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of con-
science of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose it by the
process.2 °6
Certainly those who, by joining the armed forces, actively seek to pre-
serve and defend the state need no less consideration. The present
system of civilian judicial review has proven to be incapable of adjudi-
cating their claims because of its lack of special expertise in matters
relating to "the handling of men." It is therefore proposed that such
claims be referred to the civilian judges of the Court of Military Ap-
peals who have shown their willingness and expertise in balancing the
demands of military efficiency and conscience.
206. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COL. U.Q. 253, 269 (1919).
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APPENDIX: CORRECTION AND DISCHARGE
REVIEW BOARD CASES
INTRODUCTION
Correction and Discharge Board decisions are indexed separately
by service and assigned a classification which designates the type of
board which considered the request, the year in which the request was
decided,20 7 and the decision's chronological place in that year's se-
quence of decisions. Thus, AC 80-01597 is the fifteen hundred and
ninety-seventh case considered by the Army Correction Board in
1980. The designation "AD" would indicate a case decided by the
Army Discharge Review Board. The decisions have been
microformed, and the microfiches numbered sequentially. The fiche
number and the number of the frame on which the decision begins are
listed. For example, the Board's action in case AC 80-1597 begins on
fiche 4137, frame F8. Whenever the author has quoted directly from
a report, the frame number in which the quotation is found has been
cited.
In summarizing the decisions, the following facts concerning the
applicants were considered to be relevant: age at enlistment, level of
education and mental category, 208 years of service, frequency and type
of minor punishment imposed as well as offenses charged, and the
nature of and basis for discharge. The Board's decision was included
to satisfy the reader's curiosity, but the Board's rationale was not
summarized unless it was pertinent to the applicant's religious beliefs.
The decisions are referred to by year of discharge, branch of ser-
vice, and sequence within the year. For example, "1951 Navy 2" indi-
cates the year the serviceman was originally discharged, the branch of
207. "79", for example, denotes cases decided in 1979. A few cases are designated as 7X.
These are Army Correction Board cases initially denied between 1971 and 1976 and reconsid-
ered in 1977-78 as part of the settlement in Heiler v. Williams, 4 MIL. L. REP. (Pub. L. Educ.
Inst.) 3009 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1976).
208. See Rimland & Larson, The Manpower Quality Decline: An Ecological Perspective, 8
ARMED FORCES & Soc. 21, 67, n.8. "The mental quality of military accessions is measured by
scores received on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Tests (ASVAB). A por-
tion of the ASVAB scores is then converted to a standardized test score called the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Based on AFQT percentile scores, enlistees [and previ-
ously, draftees] are classified into one of five mental categories, with Category I being the
highest. The average score is 50, which divides Mental Category III. The top 8 %, from 93 to
100, are in Mental Category I; the next 27 %, from 65 to 93, in Mental Category II; the next
33 %, from 31 to 64, in Category III; and the next 20 %, from 10 to 30, in Category IV.
Those scoring in Category V are disqualified from [the] military." Id.
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service from which he received his discharge, and the fact that his was
the second case in that service involving possible religious discrimina-
tion which could be found among board records. The cases are sum-
marized below.
1945 ARMY 1 (AC 80-01597) [4137, Fl]
A black ex-private sought to have his dishonorable discharge up-
graded. He received the discharge as a part of his sentence following
a conviction for desertion in war-time. He had been convicted twice
before for brief absences without leave. Drafted at age twenty-eight,
in mental category IV, he never achieved a grade higher than private.
He claimed that he went absent without leave (AWOL) because he
had become a Jehovah's Witness and, therefore, was opposed to com-
bat, but felt that he would not be reassigned to a clerical or non-com-
bat position. His claim was not corroborated and the Board
concluded that even if his religious beliefs precluded service in a com-
bat unit, appropriate administrative avenues existed by which he
could have obtained non-combat status.
1946 ARMY 2 (AD 80-02207) [3094, E9]
A Roman Catholic ex-enlisted man sought to have his "Blue Dis-
charge" upgraded. This discharge category was the functional
equivalent of an undesirable discharge and was awarded between 1913
and 1948.209 He was AWOL for approximately two months, and sub-
sequently was convicted by a summary court-martial. He claimed
that he went AWOL because his fellow soldiers ridiculed him when he
knelt in the evening beside his bed to pray for his deceased father. He
attributed a second AWOL period to continuing ridicule by his fellow
soldiers. Three of the five members of the Board, in rejecting his re-
quest, concluded that his claim was unsubstantiated. However, the
relatively minor punishment which he received for each absence sug-
gests that the Army authorities had accepted his contentions and mit-
igated his punishment accordingly.
209. See Comment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ A Statutory
and Equal Protection Analysis of Military Discharge Certificates, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
227, 247 n.73 (1974).
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1946 ARMY 3 (AD 80-03102) [3896, A9]
A black twenty-eight-year-old member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of the Apostolic Faith was inducted in 1944, although he had
been previously classified 4F (ineligible) and was diagnosed by an
Army psychiatrist as having an "attitude problem" as well as being a
"severe, borderline mental deficiency-religious fanatic." [All]. He
was processed for discharge on the grounds that he exhibited habits
and traits of character which rendered him undesirable for Army ser-
vice. His commander stated that he "[exhibited] many symptoms of
religious fanaticism." [B2]. His first sergeant testified that "we did
everything possible to make Private - into a good soldier, even to the
extent of moving him from barracks to barracks, so that he could be
with his religious brothers." [B3]. Another non-commissioned officer
stated that "[tihe frustration, hysteria, or phobia that Private - is
immersed [in]... is not compatible with Army routine. I am of the
opinion that his fetishism is beyond [the] point of reasoning." [D2].
He was court-martialed for failure to obey a lawful order, and then
convicted by a special court-martial for failure to obey and being
AWOL. He claimed that he was a minister of his church, and that he
should have been discharged as a conscientious objector. A majority
of the Board recommended recharacterization of his "Blue Dis-
charge" to "Under Honorable Conditions" because they felt that his
superior should have made a greater effort to transfer him to a non-
combat unit, and that his marginal mental qualifications contributed
to his behavior.
1951 ARMY 4 (AD 80-03993) [3967, F13]
A nineteen-year-old black Muslim classified as being in mental cat-
egory IV, went AWOL for twenty-seven days after having been in the
Army for two months. He was convicted of that offense by a special
court-martial. He claimed that he went AWOL because he had never
intended to enlist in the first place, but, rather, meant to work as a
civilian. His Muslim teachers persuaded him to return to military
control, after which he was placed in pretrial confinement, where he
could not eat the food. He was subsequently returned to his unit
where he lived on peanuts and water for two to three months. There
was evidence that military authorities attempted to help him with his
diet problems, but, after six months of service, a board of officers
found that the applicant evidenced traits of character which rendered
his retention in the Army undesirable. An undesirable discharge was
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issued after he had been AWOL a second time. The Discharge Re-
view Board unanimously voted to grant him partial relief in the form
of a general discharge on the grounds that he had a reduced capacity
to serve due to his religious beliefs.
1952 ARMY 5 (AD 80-04828) [3380, B12]
A twenty-year-old, placed in mental category IV, was inducted into
the Army and went AWOL shortly thereafter. He was convicted of
that offense by a special court-martial, but the sentence of two months
confinement was suspended. A month later, he went AWOL for six
weeks, returned for two weeks, and then went AWOL again for two
months. He was court-martialed and received six months confine-
ment. An Army psychiatrist recommended an administrative dis-
charge because of his anti-social personality. He subsequently
received an undesirable discharge which he sought to have
recharacterized on two grounds: 1) military duty and the possibility
that he would have to kill a human being were contrary to his reli-
gious beliefs; and 2) he had a medical problem, present at the time of
induction into the service, which made him physically unable to serve
in the military. The Board rejected both contentions as being
unsubstantiated.
1952 NAVY 1 (ND 81-05667) [2971, Al]
A nineteen-year-old Jewish sailor with a tenth-grade education was
given an undesirable discharge for numerous petty offenses including
being AWOL for eleven days. He sought to have his discharge up-
graded on the ground that he was discriminated against because of his
religious beliefs. The Board rejected the contention as being
unsubstantiated.
1956 ARMY 6 (AD 81-0988) [7755, Cl]
An eighteen-year-old Seventh Day Adventist with a tenth-grade ed-
ucation enlisted in 1954. After basic training and approximately a
year in Germany, he returned to the United States where he received
two non-judicial punishments under the provisions of article 15 of the
UCMJ, and a conviction by a special court-martial for being AWOL.
He received an undesirable discharge for unfitness, which he subse-
quently sought to have upgraded on the grounds that his offenses
were due to conflicts with his platoon sergeant. He alleged that the
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sergeant did not want him to go to church on Saturday, harassed him,
and placed him on KP and guard duty. His contentions were rejected
on the grounds that they were unsubstantiated and that he had failed
to bring the alleged harassment to the attention of the board which
originally considered his discharge.
1958 ARMY 7 (AD 81-09525) [6430, F14]
The applicant, who had a ninth-grade education, was inducted into
the Army. He subsequently claimed conscientious objector status and
asserted that he could not handle weapons. While his claim was being
processed, he was transferred to a medical unit. He received an unde-
sirable discharge for frequent misconduct of a discreditable character
evidenced by three instances of non-judicial punishment imposed for a
three day AWOL and missed "bed checks" and two summary court-
martial convictions resulting from a day long AWOL and breaching a
restriction on his movements. The Discharge Review Board,
although finding no evidence of religious or racial discrimination,
granted partial relief in the form of a general discharge on the ground
that the characterization of his service was too harsh.
1959 NAVY 2 (ND 80-02696) [694, BI]
After enlisting at the age of seventeen, a Jewish seaman, claiming
one year of college, received an undesirable discharge for repeated
petty offenses three years and eight months later. Most of the offenses
were not religiously motivated: five episodes of disobedience; one in-
stance of using profanity; two instances of possessing other seamen's
clothing; two unauthorized absences; and theft for which he was con-
victed by a special court-martial. Another special court-martial con-
viction for disobedience had been disapproved on review. In addition,
he missed the sailing of his vessel after he was denied leave to attend
services celebrating the Jewish high holy days. He was convicted of
being AWOL and "missing movement of his ship," and his military
obligation was extended to accommodate the days lost during confine-
ment and while AWOL. He subsequently received two additional
convictions by summary courts-martial for sleeping on duty and a
two-day unauthorized absence. The Board concluded that it was
within his commander's prerogative to deny him leave and that there
was no evidence he had sought counsel or advice from his chaplain.
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1964 ARMY 8 (AD 79-05964/005964B) [764, E9]
In a personal appearance before the Board, the applicant, classified
as being in mental category III, with one semester of college, stated
that he enlisted at age nineteen to avoid the draft. After training, he
was sent to Germany where he alleged he was subjected to verbal,
physical and emotional abuse by various supervisors because he was
Jewish. He claimed that evidence of frequent misconduct of a dis-
creditable nature were the products of anti-semitism. The misconduct
charged included failure to report, wearing an improper uniform, ab-
sences from bed checks and his unit, dereliction of duty, and being
AWOL. In addition, he had two summary court-martial convictions
for disrespect and dereliction of duty and two special court-martial
convictions for disobedience. The Board examined the record and
concluded that the charge of religious discrimination was being used
to divert attention from his inadequacies as a soldier. The Board also
noted that the complaint had been investigated by a chaplain and
found to be groundless. Relief was denied.
1967 ARMY 9 (AD 81-00321) [3610, All]
A twenty-four-year-old college graduate in mental category II was
drafted and given an undesirable discharge three months later after
having received two article 15 punishments for failure to report and
disobedience. He sought recharacterization of his discharge, claiming
that his "educational, and by implication, [his] religious and regional
background was seen discriminatorily."[B1] He further asserted that
his performance in the service was a result of this discrimination and,
thus, his discharge should be upgraded to honorable. The Board re-
jected his request and the particular contentions made, noting that the
applicant was referred to the Jewish chaplain for counselling, indicat-
ing that the applicant had not been dealt with in a discriminatory
manner.
1967 ARMY 10 (AC 82-10743) [8903, A14]
A nineteen-year-old inductee, placed in mental category II, was
classified in the Selective Service System as a conscientious objector.
He was sent for modified basic training as a non-combatant medical
corpsman. He refused to train, and his claim that he should be dis-
charged on hardship grounds was rejected. He was court-martialed
after being AWOL, and was confined for two and one-half months. A
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL
month later his request that he be reassigned to non-medical training
because he was a member of the Pentecostal Church of God in Christ,
and, thus, believed only in divine healing and did not believe in giving
or receiving medication, was granted. He subsequently failed an ad-
ministrative training course, went AWOL for two days, and was
transferred to cooking school from which he went AWOL again. He
received an undesirable discharge for unfitness. His request that the
discharge be upgraded because he was assigned duties incompatible
with his conscientious objector status was rejected.
1967 MARINE CORPS 1 (MD 78-03695) [755, E13]
An eighteen-year-old, with ten and one-half years of civilian educa-
tion, enlisted and completed basic training with marginal ratings.
Sometime after his enlistment, he became converted to the Nation of
Islam. He went AWOL for two months and was court-martialed.
The special court sentenced him to confinement for four months, but
post-trial clemency curtailed his confinement to one month. Subse-
quently, he was assigned as a driver and permitted to drill without a
rifle, apparently because of religious convictions. He then was con-
victed by a special court-martial of willful disobedience of an order,
and sentenced to six months confinement and a bad conduct dis-
charge. His confinement was subsequently curtailed to four months
and the discharge suspended on the condition that he perform satis-
factorily. A week after the trial he sought discharge as a conscien-
tious objector. The request was rejected and he went AWOL again,
this time for approximately nine months. He was convicted of that
offense by another special court-martial, and sentenced to a bad
conduct discharge and confinement for six months. He sought to
have his discharge upgraded on the grounds that his first amendment
rights had been violated because his religious convictions were the
basis of his court-martial for disobedience and his superiors were
prejudiced against his religion. Both contentions were rejected as
unsubstantiated.
1968 ARMY 11 (AD 7X-001773) [2158, C6]
A twenty-year-old Seventh Day Adventist high school graduate in
mental category IV went AWOL after completing advanced infantry
training and received article 15 punishment. He later was convicted
of disobedience by a special court-martial and confined. The day he
was released from confinement, he went AWOL. He was court-mar-
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tialed for that absence and was given an undesirable discharge while
serving his sentence. He sought to have the discharge upgraded on
the grounds that he had requested transfer from his unit but was only
offered combat, which was against his religion. The Board rejected
his argument on the grounds that "the applicant's training and assign-
ment was in accordance with regulations concerning his religious sta-
tus." [C10].
1971 NAVY 3 (NC 81-7192) [2447, A7]
A nineteen-year-old high school graduate, classified as mental cate-
gory I, enlisted in the Navy. He was a member of the World Wide
Church of God. He received a bad conduct discharge after a general
court-martial found him guilty of being AWOL for fifteen months.
The applicant had previously been convicted twice by special courts-
martial for unauthorized absences totalling eighty-one days. He
sought upgrading of the discharge on the grounds that his absences
were due to his superiors' refusal to recognize his claim of conscien-
tious objection and that his church had directed him to go AWOL.
The Board rejected his request, noting that there was nothing in his
record concerning his religious beliefs until after he had returned
from his third absence, and that a letter which he submitted from the
World Wide Church of God had advised him not to go AWOL, but
rather to seek separation under Navy regulations.
1971 ARMY 12 (AD 81-07020) [6877, C3]
In this case, the applicant was classified as being in mental category
IV, but was described as "highly intelligent" by the colonel who inter-
viewed him before his undesirable discharge. The discharge was given
in lieu of trial by court-martial for seven absences without leave which
the applicant attributed to family and financial problems. He blamed
his prior disciplinary record in Vietnam, consisting of two article 15
punishments for disobedience and a special court-martial conviction
for pointing his rifle at a fellow soldier, to racism and religious preju-
dice. Although the Board rejected the contentions of racial and reli-
gious prejudice, they granted him a general discharge in view of his
service in Vietnam, where he had been wounded and received a Pur-
ple Heart medal.
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1972 ARMY 13 (AD 82-07148) [7964, C6]
The twenty-one-year-old applicant in this proceeding had sixteen
years of education, was placed in mental category IV, and was a mem-
ber of the Apostolic Faith of Jesus Christ. He went AWOL immedi-
ately following his induction into the Army. After his return to
military control and pending his court-martial, he sought discharge as
a conscientious objector. His commander and chaplain supported his
application as being sincere, but it was rejected because, contrary to
what he had told them, he had never sought conscientious objector
status from his draft board, a prerequisite for release from active duty.
Before he was told of the decision on his discharge application, he
went AWOL again and was apprehended thirteen months later. He
applied for, and was granted, an undesirable discharge in lieu of trial.
He subsequently applied for upgrading of his discharge on the
grounds that "[a]t the time of my draft I had recently given my life to
Jesus Christ... [M]y pastor at the time.., convinced me that AWOL
was the only way out . . . ." [C8]. The Board rejected his request,
concluding that he had been treated properly by the military system.
1972 ARMY 14 (AC 84-01462) [9392, B14]
A twenty-year-old with eleven years of education and classified as
mental category III was sent to Korea. He subsequently was con-
victed by a summary court-martial of a number of offenses, including
impeding the military police, disrespect and disobedience, and being
AWOL for four days. The following month he was punished under
article 15 of the UCMJ for being AWOL again. When his com-
mander initiated action to administratively discharge him for frequent
incidents of misconduct and a negative and resentful attitude, he
waived his right to a hearing and was given a general discharge. He
sought to have his discharge upgraded to honorable on a number of
grounds, including the fact that he had to travel twenty to thirty miles
to see a chaplain and attend church services. His request was re-
jected, and the Board concluded that the lack of religious support did
not excuse his acts of misconduct.
1973 ARMY 15 (AD 80-06770) [3756, Gi]
A twenty-year-old Black Muslim high school graduate, placed in
mental category III, was inducted into the Army after his application
to the Selective Service System for conscientious objector status had
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been denied. He stated that he was unaware of his right to appeal that
decision. After induction, he again applied for conscientious objector
status. His commander and chaplain were convinced that he was sin-
cere and had held his beliefs prior to induction. After extensive inves-
tigation, his request was denied in accordance with Army regulations,
which directed disapproval when a request was based solely on infor-
mation presented to and rejected by the Selective Service. He imme-
diately went AWOL for thirty-two days. When he returned, he
waived trial by court-martial and was given an undesirable discharge.
Although two of the five Board members thought the discharge
should be upgraded, the majority concluded that the discharge was
proper and equitable.
1973 NAVY 4 (ND 79-01500) [628, E13]
No personal data was included in this file. The applicant had re-
ceived a general discharge for apathy and a defective attitude. He
requested that his discharge be upgraded, claiming that he should not
have been allowed to enlist in light of his low test scores. He also
asserted that he had been subjected to discrimination because he was
black and had converted to Judaism. This request was rejected.
1974 ARMY 16 (AD 81-06201) [3000, B12]
In this case, the applicant was an eighteen-year-old, classified as
being in mental category III, who served uneventfully for two years.
He then received an undesirable discharge in lieu of trial by court-
martial for two unauthorized absences from duty. He previously had
received non-judicial punishment for stealing from a vending
machine. He offered a number of reasons in support of his request
that the discharge be upgraded, of which two were related to his reli-
gious beliefs. He claimed that as a Seventh Day Adventist he had not
been allowed to observe his Sabbath and that he had been discouraged
from applying for conscientious objector status. The Board con-
cluded that none of his contentions were supported by evidence in the
record and rejected his request.
1975 MARINE CORPS 2 (MD 78-01227) [663, E8]
The applicant in this proceeding was eighteen years old and had
eleven years of civilian education. He received an undesirable dis-
charge for unfitness based on frequent misconduct of a discreditable
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nature. After receiving non-judicial punishment for disobedience of
orders to clean up a bathroom, disrespect, and possession of mari-
juana, he sought conscientious objector status. Shortly after his re-
quest was returned for additional information, he received non-
judicial punishment for an unauthorized absence. A week later, he
went AWOL and was convicted of that offense by a special court-
martial. Three days after his conviction, he was given non-judicial
punishment for yet another unauthorized absence. The same day, his
commander initiated action to discharge him. He testified at the hear-
ing in which he sought to have his discharge upgraded that he was a
member of the Seventh Day Adventist faith. He claimed he enlisted
believing that he would fit in. While he performed satisfactorily ini-
tially, he began to experience problems after being assigned to per-
form duties which required the wearing of a weapon. He asserted
that, while he was able to discuss his religion in depth with his com-
manding officer, they didn't get along. He also alleged that he had
been harassed and pressured by his commanding officer with refer-
ences to the Bible. The Board rejected his testimony on the grounds
that it lacked specificity and failed to establish either harassment or
unfair stigmatization.
1976 ARMY 17 (AD 77-01977) [2514, A9]
Converting to Islam at nineteen, this applicant with eight years of
education and classified as being in mental category II was inducted
into the Army. After completing training with excellent ratings, he
went AWOL. He claimed in his request for discharge upgrading that
his absence was due to harassment he received from his peers in the
barracks because he did not wish to fire his weapon during training.
He further claimed that his request for exemption from service as a
conscientious objector had been rejected. He was not punished and
served for two months before going AWOL again. He was convicted
of the offense by a special court-martial. After yet another unauthor-
ized absence, he requested a discharge in lieu of trial by court-martial.
When he subsequently sought to have his undesirable discharge up-
graded, the Board rejected the contention that his religious back-
ground affected his ability to serve, noting that no evidence was
produced which demonstrated that the applicant held religious con-
victions incompatible with military service.
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1976 MARINE CORPS 3 (MD 19-01640) [901, A140]
A nineteen-year-old Black enlistee with twelve years of civilian edu-
cation listed his religious preference at induction as Baptist, although
he later claimed he was a follower of Islam. After completing train-
ing, he soon went AWOL. He received article 15 punishment for the
absence and was transferred to another post. He then received three
article 15 punishments for damaging government property and for
failing to check in as required. After counselling by a chaplain, who
described the applicant as a black militant, he was apparently charged
with other offenses unspecified in the Board report. Following two
further unauthorized absences from duty, he was discharged in lieu of
trial. His request for upgrading of his undesirable discharge on the
grounds that his behavior was motivated by his religious beliefs was
denied.
1976 ARMY 18 (AD 79-00324) [4707, E14]
The applicant in this case, who felt his religious beliefs made him a
longer, was seventeen years old with eleven years of education and a
mental category IV classification. He was given an undesirable dis-
charge for unfitness after receiving four non-judicial punishments for
failure to report for duty, failure to obey a lawful order, and absence
from duty. His religious affiliation was not given in the file. His re-
quest for an honorable discharge was rejected because there was no
evidence to support his contention that his ability to serve was im-
paired by discriminatory attitudes toward his religious views.
1977 NAVY 5 (ND 78-02074) [493, C1I]
The applicant in this case enlisted at age eighteen and had twelve
years of education. After completing training, he was assigned to a
destroyer escort. He sought to be discharged because he was not able
to fulfill the responsibilities of his Jewish faith aboard ship. His re-
quest was disapproved "in the interests of fairness and equitable treat-
ment for all." [D12]. During 1976, he received a substandard
performance report and non-judicial punishments for failure to obey a
lawful order, using provoking words and gestures combined with a
racial slur, and being drunk in a public place. Subsequently, he was
given a non-judicial punishment for being AWOL. He was given a
general discharge, however, for medical reasons. When he sought to
have the discharge upgraded to honorable, the Board rejected his re-
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quest, stating that "[t]he religious belief and physical disability of the
applicant does not excuse his misbehavior or poor performance."
[C14].
1977 MARINE CORPS 4 (MD 78-00993) [649, C12]
This applicant, a twenty-year-old with twelve years of civilian edu-
cation, received non-judicial punishment for undescribed offenses fif-
teen days following his enlistment. He was convicted by a special
court-martial after going AWOL, but his sentence was not reported.
He subsequently received an undesirable discharge in lieu of trial after
going AWOL again. When he sought to have his discharge
recharacterized, one of the contentions he advanced was that the dis-
charge was inequitable because "his capability to serve was affected by
deep religious convictions, which prevented him from serving in a
combat unit, even though he did not qualify for classification or dis-
charge as a conscientious objector." [C12]. His religion was not
given, nor were his religious convictions described. The Board re-
jected his request because he had never applied to be classified as a
conscientious objector.
1978 ARMY 19 (AD 80-08149) [3145, E4]
This applicant with ten years of education had first enlisted at age
seventeen. He served two years and received an honorable discharge.
He reenlisted two years later, waiving a veteran's disability pension to
do so. He was honorably discharged after one year so that he could
reenlist for six years. He went AWOL after his second reenlistment
and remained in that status for over two years. He received an unde-
sirable discharge in lieu of court-martial. He offered a number of rea-
sons for his absence, including heavy drug use and lack of respect in
his unit. He further asserted that his being a servant of Christ Jesus
and studying to be a minister of the gospel was not compatible with
Army life. The Board rejected his request that his discharge under
other than honorable conditions be upgraded because there was no
evidence he had ever sought to discuss his personal problems with his
superiors.
1979 NAVY 6 (ND 83-02553) [3443, D13]
This eighteen-year-old immigrant alien enlistee with twelve years of
education was assigned to a ship after completing training. After be-
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ing cautioned regarding his performance, he went AWOL, remaining
absent for sixteen days. He was given non-judicial punishment upon
his return to military control. Soon thereafter, he went AWOL again
and missed a sailing. When he returned, he was convicted of the ab-
sence by a summary court-martial. While he later achieved a promo-
tion, he went AWOL yet again and was charged with desertion
following his apprehension by civilian authorities. He pleaded guilty
before a special court-martial and was awarded a bad conduct dis-
charge, which he subsequently sought to have upgraded. The appli-
cant testified that he experienced problems with his shipmates because
he was a Seventh Day Adventist; he perceived that his religious prac-
ticed rendered him weird in the view of his peers. He further testified
that he was forced to work on his Sabbath and was told his only re-
course was to apply for conscientious objector status. No relief was
granted.
1979 ARMY 21 (AD 80-13087) [3181, E14]
This proceeding concerned a seventeen-year-old enlistee with
eleven years of education who was placed in mental category III. He
received an undesirable discharge for frequent misconduct evidenced
by four article 15 punishments given for twice disobeying lawful or-
ders, eating without permission, failing to go to his appointed place of
duty, wrongfully accepting collect telephone calls, and twice failing to
go to his appointed place of duty. He also had received a summary
court-martial conviction for two failures to appear at duty assign-
ments and for disobeying a standing order by entering female sleeping
quarters. As part of his sentence, he was sent to a rehabilitation pro-
gram. When he sought to have his discharge upgraded, he explained
that he was a member of the World Wide Church of God which rec-
ognizes Saturday as the Sabbath, but only began to take his religion
seriously after basic and airborne training where military authorities
considered his religion "a joke." [F3]. He was then transferred to
Fort Dix, New Jersey where
he worked out a deal with his unit leadership at Ft. Dix [not to work on
Saturday] however things did not work out .... He was transferred
from Ft. Dix to Ft. Riley and was able to work out something with the
unit leadership to facilitate not working on Saturday. However, it be-
came a problem due to complaints from unit personnel.
[Id. ]. The Board concluded that many of the episodes of misconduct
were unrelated to his religious beliefs and denied relief.
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1980 ARMY 22 (AD 81-09222) [6784, Al]
An eighteen-year-old enlisted man with eleven years of education
went AWOL and was given a discharge under other than honorable
conditions in lieu of court-martial. When he sought to have his dis-
charge upgraded, he said that his drill instructor was prejudiced
against his race and religion and, although he was transferred to an-
other unit, he felt he "would simply meet further prejudice elsewhere"
and, therefore, went AWOL. [A5]. The Board did not find his state-
ment sufficiently compelling to warrant recharacterization of the
discharge.
1980 ARMY 23 (AD 81-09822) [6355, E12]
This applicant originally enlisted at age eighteen with twelve years
of education, and was honorably discharged two years later. He im-
mediately reenlisted. While stationed in Germany, he converted to
the Islamic faith and sought a monetary allowance to take his meals
in the community, rather than the dining hall, because of the dietary
requirements of his religion. The request was denied. Subsequently,
he received non-judicial punishment for failure to go to his appointed
place of duty. The Board report referred to statements in the appli-
cant's file which showed he had been counselled for a disrespectful
manner and attitude as well as disobedience. The file also contained
evidence of misconduct resulting in article 15 punishment and court-
martial action. The serviceman had requested a discharge in lieu of
trial, which was granted under other than honorable conditions. The
Board concluded that there was no evidence that his misconduct had
been provoked by prejudice or his religion and denied relief.
1981 ARMY 24 (AD 82-00662) [7677, Al]
A twenty-three-year-old high school graduate in mental category
III had an unblemished record following his enlistment until he re-
ceived a general discharge in lieu of court-martial. The discharge was
a result of the applicant's failure to adhere to service policy regarding
hair and beard length. While his entry records listed him as a Baptist,
the applicant professed to belong to the Rastafarian faith. There was
evidence that his adherence to Rastafarian tenets was selective and
that uncut hair was not absolutely required by that religion. The
Board rejected the applicant's contention that he was discriminated
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against and should have gotten an honorable discharge, noting that
the Army had followed established and proper procedures.
1982 ARMY 25 (AD 84-05789) [9790, E4]
This applicant was an enlistee and a nineteen-year-old high school
graduate in mental category IV. The only woman among the appli-
cants, she served in Korea for one year and then went AWOL for
three months. She was discharged under other than honorable condi-
tions in lieu of court-martial. She offered two reasons for her absence:
her religion forbade her to wear trousers; and she was separated from
her husband because they had been stationed at separate posts and the
Army failed to help them get a joint domicile. The Board rejected her
request, noting that there was no record of her having sought assist-
ance because of her religious beliefs, and that her military record did
not indicate that she was married and had sought a joint domicile
with her husband.
1981 ARMY 26 (AD 82-02060) [7812, Dl]
A twenty-year-old high school graduate placed in mental category
III, this enlistee was promoted to private soon after completing train-
ing. He was offered non-judicial punishment shortly thereafter for
three offenses, two for disobeying a non-commissioned officer and one
for disobeying an officer. He refused non-judicial punishment, was
tried by a summary court-martial, and convicted. The following
month, a special court-martial convicted him of threatening a female
private. He was transferred to another post, where he received two
non-judicial punishments for participating in a breach of the peace
and disobeying an officer. When he appeared before a board of of-
ficers considering him for administrative discharge, he explained that
he was a Rastafarian when he enlisted, that his religion forbade him
from cutting his hair or shaving, and that his offenses related to his
religious beliefs. He was given a discharge under other than honora-
ble conditions because of misconduct. The Board refused to upgrade
the discharge, saying that he failed to follow Army regulations re-
garding accommodation for religious practices.
1981 ARMY 27 (AD 83-01580) [559, G2]
This high school graduate in mental category II had originally en-
listed in the Army when he was twenty-two, and had been honorably
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discharged three years later. He reenlisted when he was twenty-seven,
and served a year before going AWOL for ten days, for which he re-
ceived non-judicial punishment. He was subsequently notified that he
was being considered for discharge due to unsuitability. He submitted
a statement saying that, due to his religious beliefs, he could no longer
participate in an organization that promoted violence or the use of
weapons of destruction. He was given a general discharge. Although
he claimed that the characterization of his discharge was inequitable
because he had a diminished capability to serve based on his con-
science and religious discrimination, the Board rejected both
contentions.
1983 ARMY 28 (AD 83-03002) [9172, Bll]
An eighteen-year-old with ten years of education, the applicant in
this case was discharged four months after his enlistment for substan-
dard entry-level performance and conduct. He sought to have his dis-
charge, which was uncharacterized, changed to honorable on the
grounds that he had been punished for his personal values and reli-
gious beliefs, which prevented him from fitting in. The Board rejected
the contention that an uncharacterized discharge was punishment.
Relying on a report of six counselling sessions prepared by the unit
chaplain who had detected no deeply held religious beliefs that would
conflict with military service, the Board agreed with his commander's
assessment that he should be discharged for "lack of motivation, neg-
ative attitude and steadfast disregard for physical conditioning."
[B 13].
[Vol. 18:12331294
